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INTRODUCTION 
Assuming that society and the justice system possess an inherent 
interest in truth,1 what social benefit justifies what would arguably be 
the most intimate invasion of privacy possible?2 What is the role of 
the jury, and what purpose does it serve within the larger confines of 
our justice system?3  Is it possible to utilize lie detection technology 
without displacing the jury’s role and purpose?4 
What does it mean for evidence to be reliable? How reliable must 
evidence be before we allow it to be considered by the jury?  Would 
that level of reliability be different if the evidence was only shown to 
a judge?  Does the requisite level of reliability differ for different 
kinds of evidence?5  In determining reliability, why must a judge use 
scientific norms to assess legal relevance?6  If lie detection becomes 
sufficiently reliable under legal standards, will it be admissible in 
court? 
These are but a few of the questions that the advent of deception 
detection using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) has 
raised.  This Note only purports to definitively answer the last of 
these questions: whether lie detection, if it becomes sufficiently 
reliable under legal standards, will be admissible in court, while 
shedding light on at least some of the others.  As an established 
scholar in the field of neuroimaging recently pointed out, the 
comparisons of this technology to the mind-reading lore of 1984, 
Minority Report, and Inception are premature, generating debates 
that are ‘‘too untethered from scientific reality.’’7  This technology, 
																																																																																																																																
 1. Charles N.W. Keckler, Cross-Examining the Brain: A Legal Analysis of 
Neural Imaging for Credibility Impeachment, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 509, 553--54 (2006).  
Keckler assumes that ‘‘society possesses an interest in the truth, and that the Anglo-
American adversary system purports to serve this interest.’’ Id.  But the admissibility 
of fMRI deception detection technology must be contemplated in a vacuum because 
the economic litigation approach, under which ‘‘litigation is preferred over settlement 
only so long as the parties have different expectations of trial outcome,’’ may in fact 
perpetuate confusion. Id. 
 2. See Brian Reese, Using fMRI as a Lie Detector-----Are We Lying to 
Ourselves?, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 205, 205 (2009). 
 3. See Julie A. Seaman, Black Boxes, 58 EMORY L. J. 427, 434 (2008). 
 4. See Aaron M. Stronge, Absolute Truth or Deus Ex Machina?: The Legal and 
Philosophical Ramifications of Guilt-Assessment Technology, 10 J. HIGH TECH. L. 
113 (2009). 
 5. See generally Frederick Schauer & Barbara A. Spellman, Is Expert Evidence 
Really Different? 9 (Feb. 1, 2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2210397. 
 6. See id. 
 7. Francis X. Shen, Neuroscience, Mental Privacy, and the Law, 36 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 653, 655 (2013). 
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however, is more likely than any others that have come before it to 
reliably distinguish a person’s truthful statements from deceptive 
ones.8 
Part I of this Note provides an overview of the anatomy of a lie and 
the technologies used to detect them.  Part II discusses the relevant 
evidentiary rules governing the admissibility of such technology, as 
well as the evidentiary significance of these technologies under these 
rules.  Part III considers the admissibility of fMRI deception 
detection technology once it becomes reliable enough to satisfy the 
standards governing scientific expert testimony.  Part IV concludes 
the discussion, finding that this technology’s probative value will not 
be outweighed by any potential for undue prejudice, or to confuse or 
mislead the jury. 
I.  BACKGROUND 
A. Lie Detection 
Humans have sought the ability to distinguish the truth from a lie 
from time immemorial.  Lies take many different forms, and different 
techniques and technologies have been developed to try to measure 
these different lies.  The most famous lie detection technology is the 
polygraph, but new technology that measures the brain’s activity now 
offers the greatest potential to be of use for the legal system. 
1. Executive Function 
Evolution has endowed humans with several capabilities that 
separate us from our animal kin.  Of these, perhaps the most 
important is the growth of a part of our brains called the prefrontal 
cortex, which has grown at a faster rate in homo sapiens than in the 
rest of the animal kingdom.9  The prefrontal cortex is the crux of what 
separates humans from our evolutionary brethren,10 allowing us to 
engage in a broad range of behaviors encapsulated by the term 
																																																																																																																																
 8. Daniel D. Langleben & Jane Campbell Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for Lie 
Detection: Where Science, Law, and Policy Collide, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 
222, 223 (2013) (asserting that fMRI will be more successful in detecting lies than 
electroencephalography and polygraph technology). 
 9. See Katerina Semendeferi et al., Prefrontal Cortex in Humans and Apes: A 
Comparative Study of Area 10, 114 AM. J. PHYSICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 224, 224 
(2001). 
 10. See Kate Teffer & Katerina Semendeferi, Human Prefrontal Cortex: 
Evolution, Development, and Pathology, in 195 PROGRESS IN BRAIN RESEARCH 191, 
191 (Michael A. Hoffman & Dean Falk eds., 2012). 
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‘‘executive function.’’11  These behaviors include problem-solving, 
modifications in behavioral responses to stimuli, planning, and 
behavioral inhibition-----allowing humans to conform to society’s 
expectations.12  Although deception predates the evolution of 
language,13 the evolutionary growth of the brain’s prefrontal cortex, 
and consequential advent of language, led to an ‘‘efflorescence of 
[deception] complexity.’’14  This executive function system works in 
conjunction with other parts of the brain, such as those that deal with 
instincts like breathing and sleeping.15  Crucially, for the purposes of 
this Note, the executive function interacts with the parts of the brain 
that deal with memory.16 
2. Anatomy of a Lie 
Truth is not a binary concept-----it lies on a wide spectrum.17  There 
are theoretically three types of lies.18  First, when a subject, who 
knows of some fact X, is asked if he knows of X, and he feigns 
																																																																																																																																
 11. Sean A. Spence et al., A Cognitive Neurobiological Account of Deception: 
Evidence from Functional Neuroimaging, 359 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y. B 
BIOLOGICAL SCI. 1755, 1755--56 (2004). 
 12. See Archie Alexander, Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Lie 
Detection: Is A ‘‘Brainstorm’’ Heading Toward the ‘‘Gatekeeper’’?, 7 HOUS. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 1, 9--10 (2006). 
 13. See Keckler, supra note 1, at 519 (citing Robin Dunbar, On the Origin of the 
Human Mind, in EVOLUTION AND THE HUMAN MIND: MODULARITY, LANGUAGE, 
AND META-COGNITION 238--53 (Peter Carruthers & Andrew Chamberlain eds., 
2000)). 
 14. Id. at 519 n.36 (‘‘‘In human evolution, processes of deception and self-
deception were greatly heightened by the advent of language.  Language permits 
individuals to make statements about events distant in time and space, and these are 
least amenable to contradiction.  Thus, language permits verbal deception of many 
different kinds.’’’ (quoting ROBERT TRIVERS, SOCIAL EVOLUTION 416 (1985))). 
 15. See Semendeferi et al., supra note 9, at 193. 
 16. See Maria Jurado & Monica Rosselli, The Elusive Nature of Executive 
Functions: A Review of our Current Understanding, 17 NEUROPSYCHOLOGY REV. 
213, 215 (2007). 
 17. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 12--13 (describing the spectrum of conveying 
information from intentional to unintentional distortions of truth, including 
‘‘concealment, distortion, fabrication, or manipulation of truthful information’’); see 
also Keckler, supra note 1, at 539 (citing Bella M. DePaolo et al., Cues to Deception, 
129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74, 105 (2003)) (referring to a meta-analysis of 1338 cues of 
deception, which indicates a large psychological gray area between truth and deceit); 
Jed S. Rakoff, Lie Detection in the Courts: The Vain Search for the Magic Bullet, in 
USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS 40, 44 
(2009) (‘‘The law recognizes many kinds of lies, ranging from ‘white lies’ and ‘puffing’ 
to affirmative misstatements, actionable half-truths, and material omissions.’’). 
 18. These categories are the author’s own variation of several mentioned 
throughout the literature. See, e.g., Keckler, supra note 1, at 510. 
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ignorance of this fact, that is called ‘‘guilty knowledge.’’19  The second 
category is when a subject makes a genuine assertion of truth that is 
not objectively true-----these assertions are sometimes ‘‘mistakes’’ or 
‘‘delusions.’’20  The third, and possibly most important, category is 
when a subject knows of some fact X, yet when asked if he has any 
knowledge of X, he instead responds with some falsehood Y.21  The 
key difference between the latter two categories is the intent of the 
subject to deceive in the third category, as compared with the honest 
assertion of subjective truth in the second.22  In this third category, the 
subject must suppress truth X from his memory, while simultaneously 
constructing falsehood Y. 23 
3. Deception Detection Techniques 
The first of two techniques commonly used to detect deception is 
the Control Question Test (CQT).24  This test theoretically allows an 
examiner to detect deception by comparing a subject’s physical 
responses to different types of questions.25  An examiner usually asks 
an innocuous ‘‘control question,’’ such as the subject’s name, to get a 
baseline reading of the subject’s physical response while being honest 
and truthful.26  Then the examiner asks pointed and relevant 
questions, which have to do with the topic of the test.27  Deception is 
inferred when physical reactions are stronger or different in the 
‘‘relevant’’ condition than in the ‘‘control’’ condition.28 
Another commonly used method to detect deception is the Guilty 
Knowledge Test (GKT),29 which is also referred to as the Concealed 
Information Test (CIT).30  This test can theoretically determine if a 
subject has intimate knowledge about the details of a question, such 
																																																																																																																																
 19. See id. 
 20. Eric K. Gerard, Waiting in the Wings? The Admissibility of Neuroimagery for 
Lie Detection, 27 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L. 1, 7 (2008). 
 21. See Keckler, supra note 1, at 510. 
 22. See Gerard, supra note 20. 
 23. Michael S. Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal 
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. L. 301, 312--13 (2006). 
 24. See John B. Meixner, Liar, Liar, Jury’s the Trier? The Future of 
Neuroscience-Based Credibility Assessment in the Court, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1451, 
1455 (2012). 
 25. See id. 
 26. See id. at 1455--56. 
 27. See id. at 1455. 
 28. See id. at 1456. 
 29. See id. at 1458 n.42. 
 30. See id. 
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as the specific details of a crime or weapon used.31  Similar to the 
CQT, an examiner uses the GKT to derive his conclusions from the 
elevated physical response that a subject theoretically shows when 
asked about, or shown, details of a crime.32  The GKT’s distinguishing 
factor is that it does not attempt to discern if a person is lying per se; 
rather, it is only used to discern whether a person has relevant 
knowledge of details of a crime that, most likely, only the perpetrator 
would know.33  If the subject has denied knowledge of these details, 
yet the test shows physical arousal, the examiner may infer 
deception.34 
B. Lie Detection Technology 
The polygraph changed the landscape of lie detection in the 
modern age, but newer technologies that measure activity in the brain 
have the potential to alter this landscape even more significantly.35 
1. Polygraph 
Polygraph technology measures a subject’s physiological reactions 
to questions given by an examiner.36  Corrugated rubber tubes or 
electronic sensors measure respiratory activity,37 cardiographs 
measure heart rates,38 and galvanic skin electrodes measure 
perspiration.39  The premise of the polygraph test is that a subject will 
exhibit a different physiological reaction when lying than when telling 
the truth.40 
Several problems plague both the technology and its use.  First, the 
examiner’s behavior can have a strong influence on the subject and 
																																																																																																																																
 31. See id at 1458. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See id. at 1459. 
 34. See id. at 1458 (providing that in such circumstances knowledge of the crime 
may be inferred). 
 35. See Leo Kittay, Admissibility of fMRI Lie Detection: The Cultural Bias 
Against ‘‘Mind Reading’’ Devices, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1351, 1360--61 (2007). 
 36. See Frequently Asked Questions, AM. POLYGRAPH ASS’N, 
http://www.polygraph.org/section/resources/frequently-asked-questions (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2013). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Gerard, supra note 20, at 20  (citing Steven I. Friedland, Law, Science, and 
Malingering, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 337, 357 (1998)). 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. 
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his responses.41  Second, the examiner must subjectively interpret the 
results to conclude that the subject was being deceptive, allowing for 
elements of human error.42  Third, the physiological reactions that this 
technology measures are not unique to deception;43 instead of 
detecting deception, the technology could be reading reactions caused 
by anxiety from the test or its possible consequences.44  Fourth, 
polygraph tests are notoriously vulnerable to countermeasures that 
allow subjects to avoid deception detection.45  Finally, reported 
accuracy rates have a very large range, anywhere from the ‘‘toss of a 
coin’’46 to ninety percent in controlled settings.47 
2. Brain Imaging 
Examiners have utilized technology that measures brain activity to 
measure lie detection.  Older and less precise technologies have given 
way in scientific and legal realms to the fMRI. 
a. Lesser Used Technologies 
Several functional neuroimaging techniques predate the fMRI 
technique that is the focus of this Note.  Positron Emission 
Tomography (PET) and Single Photon Emission Computed 
																																																																																																																																
 41. See Spencer J. Brooks, Scanning the Horizon: The Past, Present, and Future 
of Neuroimaging for Lie Detection in Court, 51 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 353, 360 
(2013) (asserting that the expectations of the test-giver can influence both his 
interpretation and the subject’s responses); see also Gerard, supra note 20, at 21 
(asserting that an examiner’s tone of voice, posture, comportment, intonation, and 
other verbal and non-verbal cues may all affect subject responses); Kittay, supra note 
35, at 1362. 
 42. See Gerard, supra note 20, at 21 (‘‘[E]xaminers may differ in the numerical 
values they assign for a set of answers and their attendant physiological responses.’’). 
 43. Brooks, supra note 41, at 359. 
 44. Gerard, supra note 20, at 21. 
 45. Kittay, supra note 35, at 1364 (‘‘Subjects have used counter-measures, such as 
sedatives, to dampen their autonomic responses and stressors, such as flexing muscle 
or placing tacks in a shoe, to artificially inflate or create stress reactions.’’); see also 
Alexander, supra note 12, at 31 (stating that subjects may engage in ‘‘the self 
infliction of pain[] to create a false physiological response to the control questions.’’); 
Brooks, supra note 41, at 359; Gerard, supra note 20, at 21. 
 46. United States v. Cordoba, 991 F. Supp. 1199, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 1998), aff’d, 194 
F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 1999) (quoting W. Iacono & D. Lykken, The Scientific Status of 
Research on Polygraph Techniques: The Case Against Polygraph Tests, in 1 
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 14-3 (D. Faigman et al. eds., 1997)). 
 47. Kittay, supra note 35, at 1363 (citing 4 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 
40:25--28 (D. Faigman et al. eds., 2005--06)).  The American Polygraph Association 
claims accuracy in the range of eighty-five to eighty-nine percent. Polygraph Validity 
Research, AM. POLYGRAPH ASS’N, www.polygraph.org/section/resources/polygraph-
validity-research (last visited Nov. 22, 2013). 
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Tomography (SPECT) both detect the emission of gamma rays 
emitted from a radioactive tracer that is injected into a subject’s 
bloodstream.48  Both of these methods share common methodologies 
with fMRI as to how the resulting image is constructed from the raw 
data.49 
Electroencephalography (EEG) measures the brain’s electrical 
activity via electrodes placed on a scalp.50  Some scientists claim to be 
able to utilize EEG to detect experiential knowledge (or ‘‘guilty 
knowledge’’) of a an event or stimulus, called ‘‘brain fingerprinting.’’51  
Scientists measure electrical currents after giving the subject a 
stimulus,52 which is composed of some ‘‘relevant knowledge of the 
salient features or events associated with a crime.’’53  These scientists 
claim that, after being shown relevant knowledge related to the crime, 
subjects with ‘‘guilty knowledge’’ in their memory emit an electrical 
response 300 milliseconds later-----dubbed the ‘‘P300 wave.’’54 
b. Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) 
Scholars have touted fMRI as the most promising technology for 
purposes of legal lie detection55 because of its increased availability, 
reduction in cost,56 and optimal balance in resolution.57  This 
technique utilizes the ‘‘technology of regular magnetic resonance 
																																																																																																																																
 48. Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner Darkly: Functional 
Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant’s Past Mental States, 62 STAN. L. 
REV. 1119, 1136 (2010). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 35--40. 
 52. Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The Urgent 
Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 387 (2007). 
 53. Alexander, supra note 12, at 36. 
 54. See id.  For a discussion of cases that have discussed the admissibility of this 
technology, see id. at 36--40. 
 55. There is a great deal of publication on the science behind fMRI technology, 
with varying degrees of detail.  For in-depth discussion on fMRI, its various 
measurements, and the resulting inferences that can be made, see Brown & Murphy, 
supra note 48, at 1138--55.  For detailed discussion on the physics and minutiae of 
fMRI, see Alexander, supra note 12, at 15--24 (explaining fMRI technology from the 
atomic level upward).  For in-depth explanation of broader neuroscience concepts 
and technologies, see generally HENRY T. GREELY & ANTHONY D. WAGNER, 
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: REFERENCE GUIDE ON 
NEUROSCIENCE (3d ed. 2011).  For further background, see Mark Pettit, Jr., fMRI 
and BF Meet FRE: Brain Imaging and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 319, 340 (2007); Reese, supra note 2, at 227. 
 56. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138. 
 57. See ORRIN DEVINSKY & MARK D’ESPOSITO, NEUROLOGY OF COGNITIVE AND 
BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 57 (2004). 
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imaging adapted to detect changes in hemodynamic (literally ‘blood 
movement’) properties of the brain occurring when the subject is 
engaged in very specific mental tasks.’’58  fMRI is an upgrade over 
other types of neuroimaging technologies because it is quick, safe, 
and non-invasive.59  fMRI creates a primary magnetic field and one in 
each three-dimensional plane within the confines of the machine.60  
While in the apparatus, the atoms in the subject’s brain align in 
accordance with this magnetic field.61  The subject then engages in 
mental tasks while the machine measures magnetic activity in three-
dimensional, cubic volumes of brain tissue called ‘‘voxels.’’62  The 
machine records this activity in many different dimensions, or 
‘‘slices,’’ of the brain for its spatial resolution, as well as over the span 
of several seconds for temporal resolution.63  Scholars believe that 
fMRI has the best balance in the necessary trade-offs between spatial 
and temporal resolution.64 
fMRI technology indirectly monitors brain activity through the 
measurement of differences in the magnetic properties of blood over 
time, called Blood Oxygen Level Dependent (BOLD) response.65  It 
is important to emphasize that fMRI does not directly measure the 
movement or firing of neurons.66  All mental activity, however, does 
require neuronal firing-----the more complex the mental task, the more 
neurons are recruited to fire, as well as more often.67  Since the brain 
does not contain reserves for energy, neuronal access to oxygen must 
constantly be refreshed.68  The oxygenated blood carrying energy to 
																																																																																																																																
 58. Owen D. Jones et al., Brain Imaging for Legal Thinkers: A Guide for the 
Perplexed, 2009 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 5, 16. 
 59. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138.  For example, even though EEG is 
less expensive and more mobile, fMRI is vastly superior in its ability to localize the 
sources of signals in the brain. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8.  For a discussion 
of the actual experience of an fMRI scan, see Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 
1139. 
 60. See Jones et al., supra note 58, at 18. 
 61. See id. 
 62. See id. at 17. 
 63. See id.; see also Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 381--82 (discussing the 
differences and trade-offs between spatial and temporal resolution). 
 64. DEVINSKY & D’ESPOSITO, supra note 57, at 57. 
 65. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138.  For further discussion of what 
is known and the uncertainties of BOLD, see id. at 1139--42.  For a discussion of 
variability in blood flow, see Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 380--81. 
 66. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138; see also Greely & Illes, supra 
note 52, at 380. 
 67. See Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138. 
 68. Id.  The brain derives energy through the oxidation of glucose to create 
adenosine triphosphate (ATP). Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 380. 
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these neurons is magnetically discernible from deoxygenated blood 
particles that have already delivered oxygen to neurons.69  fMRI scan 
images depict the BOLD responses over time and through space-----it 
is not a picture or snapshot of the brain at any given time.70 
fMRI imaging helps researchers determine which parts of the brain 
are involved in performing cognitive tasks by utilizing the theory of 
cognitive subtraction.71  ‘‘Part of the art of fMRI imaging is designing 
an experimental task that is simple and specific so that behavioral 
responses can be attributed to an isolated mental process and not 
confounded by other functions . . . .’’72  Researchers employ the 
difference between the control and experimental tasks’ BOLD 
responses in making deductions about which pathways were used to 
accomplish the tasks in each condition.73 
Researchers have applied fMRI technology and the cognitive 
subtraction theory in an attempt to locate the neural mechanisms 
recruited for deception, with some studies confirming either the 
possibility of, or actual, experimental success in distinguishing lies 
from truth telling.74  There is currently no overwhelming consensus on 
																																																																																																																																
 69. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138. 
 70. Adina L. Roskies, Are Neuroimages Like Photographs of the Brain?, 74 PHIL. 
SCI. 860--72 (2007). 
 71. Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 383; Sean A. Spence, Playing Devil’s 
Advocate: The Case Against fMRI Lie Detection, 13 L. & CRIMINOLOGICAL 
PSYCHOL. 11, 12--13 (2008) (explaining the role of cognitive subtraction in fMRI 
research). 
 72. Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 383. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Frederick Schauer, Can Bad Science Be Good Evidence? Neuroscience, Lie 
Detection, and Beyond, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1191, 1197 n.31 (2010) (compiling the 
sources of many studies researching fMRI detection of deception); see, e.g., Christos 
Davatzikos et al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity with Machine 
Learning Methods: Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE 663, 668 (2005) 
(concluding that a nonlinear pattern classification method can detect patterns of 
brain activity associated with lying); G. Ganis et al., Neural Correlates of Different 
Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL CORTEX 830, 832--38 
(2003) (yielding results that ‘‘show that different patterns of brain activation arise 
when people tell lies than when they tell the truth’’); Joshua D. Greene & Joseph M. 
Paxton, Patterns of Neural Activity Associated with Honest and Dishonest Moral 
Decisions, 106 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 12506, 12509--10 (2009) (suggesting that 
individual differences in brain ‘‘control network activity’’ are associated with 
differences in presence of dishonest behavior); F. Andrew Kozel et al., Brief 
Communication: A Replication Study of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 
BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 852, 855 (2004) (finding that ‘‘[f]or lying, compared with 
telling the truth, there is more activation in the right anterior cingulate, right inferior 
frontal, right orbitofrontal, right middle frontal, and left middle temporal areas’’); F. 
Andrew Kozel et al., Detecting Deception Using Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605, 611 (2005) [hereinafter Kozel et al., 
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which neural regions are consistently recruited for deception.75  
Nevertheless, that may be because different experiments engender 
the assertion of different kinds of lies.  These different types of lies, in 
turn, would engage different types of cognitive processes and 
																																																																																																																																
Detecting Deception] (concluding that ‘‘fMRI can be used to detect deception within 
a cooperative individual’’); F. Andrew Kozel et al., A Pilot Study of Functional 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young Men, 
16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY & CLINICAL NEUROSCIENCE 295, 304 (2004) [hereinafter 
Kozel et al., Pilot Study] (concluding that using blood oxygen level dependent fMRI 
‘‘to investigate brain changes associated with deception is . . . possible’’); Daniel D. 
Langleben et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with Fast Event-
Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 271 (2005) [hereinafter Langleben et 
al., Telling Truth] (concluding that fMRI images may be able to distinguish a truth 
from a lie on the basis that a lie ‘‘appears to be a more working memory-intensive 
activity, characterized by increased activation of the inferolateral cortex implicated in 
response selection, inhibition, and generation’’); Daniel D. Langleben et al., Rapid 
Communication, Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An Event-Related 
Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727, 731 (2002) (finding a 
‘‘neurophysiological difference between deception and truth’’); Tatia M.C. Lee et al., 
Neural Correlates of Feigned Memory Impairment, 28 NEUROIMAGE 305, 310--12 
(2005); Tatia M.C. Lee et al., Lie Detection by Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging, 15 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 157, 163 (2002) (concluding that it is ‘‘unfeasible’’ 
to control one’s cerebral activity to avoid lie detection); Donald H. Marks et al., 
Determination of Truth From Deception Using Functional MRI and Cognitive 
Engrams, 5 INTERNET J. RADIOLOGY 1 (2006), available at http://ispub.com/ 
IJRA/5/1/9241 (showing that ‘‘specific activation patterns occur in the brain of 
individuals looking at specific pictures, and also whether they are contemplating 
giving a truthful or a deceptive response’’); Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain 
Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling about an Ecologically Valid Situation: 
Functional MR Imaging and Polygraph Investigation-----Initial Experience, 238 
RADIOLOGY 679, 679 (2006) (concluding that ‘‘specific areas of the brain involved in 
deception or truth telling can be depicted with functional MR imaging’’); Jennifer 
Maria Nuñez et al., Intentional False Responding Shares Neural Substrates with 
Response Conflict and Cognitive Control, 25 NEUROIMAGE 267, 273--76 (2005) 
(finding certain brain regions to be ‘‘significantly more active when falsifying 
information as compared to when answering truthfully’’); Sean A. Spence et al., 
Speaking of Secrets and Lies: The Contribution of Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex to 
Vocal Deception, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1411, 1415--18 (2008) [hereinafter Spence et al., 
Speaking of Secrets]; Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioural and Functional Anatomical 
Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEUROREPORT 2849, 2851--52 (2001) (finding 
that individuals telling lies have increased response times and increased activation in 
specific regions of the brain). 
 75. Compare Langleben et al., Telling Truth, supra note 74, at 271 (asserting that 
the inferolateral cortex, which is responsible for response selection, inhibition, and 
generation, is largely implicated in deception), with Jonathan G. Hakun et al., 
Towards Clinical Trials of Lie Detection with fMRI, 4 SOC. NEUROSCIENCE 518 
(2009) (hypothesizing that the prefrontal-parietal system, which is responsible for 
behavioral control and attention, is the locus of deception).  Although there is no 
overwhelming consensus, the regions that have resulted in the most consistent 
activation are the prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and parietal cortex. See 
Martha J. Farah et al., Functional MRI-Based Lie Detection: Scientific and Societal 
Challenges, 15 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 123, 123 (2014). 
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different parts of the brain.76  Subjects are first scanned during a 
baseline task of telling the truth.77  Next, the subjects are scanned 
while engaged in an experiment that leads them to lie.  Finally, the 
areas engaged in the former condition are subtracted from those in 
the latter, theoretically leaving researchers with the areas unique to 
deception.78 
Several unifying themes exist among the available scientific 
research.  First, some form of  ‘‘executive’’ function is implicated in 
choosing to respond with truth or deception,79 most often within the 
brain’s prefrontal cortex.80  Second, deception usually recruits an area 
within the brain correlated with memory.81  Third, deception usually 
requires more brain activity and more time.82  Finally, this technology 
can only test a subject’s subjective belief in the truth or falsity of his 
statements83: indeed, fMRI imaging currently cannot discern honest 
yet mistaken beliefs,84 or delusions.85 
As with any nascent science, fMRI imaging is generally improving.  
The hardware itself, as well as the algorithms and software that utilize 
the resulting raw data, are improving the technology’s accuracy and 
reliability.86  Ultimately, fMRI’s ability to accurately measure and 
																																																																																																																																
 76. Pardo, supra note 23, at 313 (2006) (citing Giorgio Ganis et al., Neural 
Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13 CEREBRAL 
CORTEX 830, 831 (2003)) (‘‘For example, spontaneous isolated lies may require 
different cognitive processes than memorized lies forming a coherent scenario.’’). 
 77. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1136 n.63 (2010). 
 78. Spence, supra note 71, at 12--13 (explaining the role of cognitive subtraction in 
fMRI research). 
 79. Alexander, supra note 12, at 11--12 (2006) (compiling the results of all known 
fMRI deception detection experiments through 2006); Keckler, supra note 1, at 535 
(analyzing the results of several major, widely-cited fMRI lie detection studies 
through 2005). 
 80. Spence, supra note 71, at 22. 
 81. Keckler, supra note 1, at 535, 539--40 (asserting that one must hold the truth in 
working memory while constructing a lie in order to be able to compare the two for a 
response). 
 82. Spence, supra note 71, at 22. 
 83. Frederick Schauer, Lie-Detection, Neuroscience, and the Law of Evidence 17 
n.36 (Oct. 22, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 
2165391. 
 84. Seaman, supra note 3, at 475 (citing Helen Pearson, Lure of Lie Detectors 
Spooks Ethicists, 441 NATURE  918, 919 (2006)) (‘‘[D]ata collected from healthy 
subjects reveal little about the mindset of someone who genuinely believes they are 
telling the truth or someone who is confused, delusional or a pathological liar.’’). 
 85. Id. (citing Sean Spence et al., ‘Munchausen’s Syndrome by Proxy’ or a 
‘Miscarriage of Justice’? An Initial Application of Functional Neuroimaging to the 
Question of Guilt Versus Innocence, 23 EUR. PSYCHOL. 309, 311--13 (2008)). 
 86. See generally Julie Elizabeth Myers, The Moment of Truth for fMRI: Will 
Deception Detection Pass Admissibility Hurdles in Oklahoma?, 6 OKLA. J. L. & 
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localize cognitive activity has created the expectation that it will be, if 
it is not already, the most successful lie detection technology yet. 87 
fMRI already enjoys several distinct technological advantages over 
the polygraph.  Most importantly, fMRI is a first-order 
measurement,88 directly measuring the central correlate of the 
nervous system.  In other words, fMRI measures the brain activity at 
its source, which gives rise to the galvanic skin response, heart rate, 
blood pressure, respiration changes that the polygraph measures.89  
Secondly, and as a corollary to the previous point, fMRI is 
theoretically less susceptible to countermeasures,90 as well as 
confounding influences.91  One scholar analogizes a subject’s complex 
neurological pattern of deception to a fingerprint: confounding 
influences, such as stress or anxiety, would create distinct patterns 
that are distinguishable from a pattern produced by deception, and 
thus would be less likely to produce false positives.92  Third, fMRI’s 
increased computerization93 allows for more accurate and objective 
results.94  Fourth, fMRI obtains data that cannot be acquired through 
																																																																																																																																
TECH. 47 (2010); see also, J.R.H. Law, Cherry-Picking Memories: Why 
Neuroimaging-Based Lie Detection Requires a New Framework for the 
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence Under FRE 702 and Daubert, 14 YALE J. L. & 
TECH. 1, 39 (2011) (‘‘Some of the newest techniques for controlling false positives 
have only been developed in the last few years.’’). 
 87. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 223 (asserting that fMRI will be more 
successful in detecting lies than EEG and polygraph technology). 
 88. Seaman, supra note 3, at 446. 
 89. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 223. 
 90. Gerard, supra note 20, at 26 (2008) (‘‘Control over blood flow within one’s 
brain is more difficult to accomplish that control over physiological responses such as 
one’s heart or respiratory rate.’’). But see Giorgio Ganis et al., Lying in the Scanner: 
Covert Countermeasures Disrupt Deception Detection by Functional Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging, 55 NEUROIMAGE 312, 317--18 (2011) (asserting that subjects can 
be trained to avoid deception detection).  Indeed, one scholar points out that due to 
the sensitivity of fMRI measurement, most small movements such as moving one’s 
head, fingers or tongue, or even doing mental arithmetic, could confound an 
experiment’s results. See Nancy Kanwisher, The Use of fMRI in Lie Detection: What 
Has Been Shown and What Has Not, in USING IMAGING TO IDENTIFY DECEIT: 
SCIENTIFIC AND ETHICAL QUESTIONS, supra note 17, at 7, 12. 
 91. Keckler, supra note 1, at 540 (stating the anxiety would create another distinct 
brain activity pattern, not create a pattern that would be confused with deception). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Neal Feigenson, Brain Imaging and Courtroom Evidence: On the 
Admissibility and Persuasiveness of fMRI, 2 INT’L J. L. CONTEXT 247 (2006) 
(discussing the objective and ‘‘mathematised’’ nature of fMRI data); Gerard, supra 
note 20, at 26 (2008). 
 94. Kittay, supra note 35, at 1365 (2007); Myers, supra note 86, at 13 (asserting 
that the computerization aspect puts fMRI in a different class of evidence than 
polygraphs, fingerprinting, and even Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequencing). 
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normal social interaction,95 and its results do not require subjective 
interpretation.96 
As it currently stands, a majority of both legal97 and scientific98 
articles contend that fMRI technology is in need of much 
improvement before its legal admissibility should be seriously 
considered.99  The application of this technology for lie detection 
purposes is also fraught with constitutional issues that must be 
addressed before its widespread adoption for criminal prosecution.100  
Besides technical improvements, fMRI must increase its 
reproducibility and reliability at several different levels: imaging must 
be conducted when the stakes are higher, on more diverse subjects, 
with testing on the individual level, and with subjects employing 
																																																																																																																																
 95. Kittay, supra note 35, at 1389 (2007) (‘‘No matter how closely a jury pays 
attention, it would not be able to determine which brain region the defendant used to 
answer a question.’’). 
 96. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1189.  However, fMRI does require 
scientists to set thresholds in the acquisition of results, which some analogize to 
interpretation. Id. 
 97. See, e.g., Charles Adelsheim, Functional Magnetic Resonance Detection of 
Deception: Great as Fundamental Research, Inadequate as Substantive Evidence, 62 
MERCER L. REV. 885 (2011); Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1189; Law, supra 
note 86, at 1. 
 98. See Schauer, supra note 74, at 1200 n.46 (citing articles from authors in 
various scientific disciplines that ‘‘insist[] that fMRI is not ready for the ‘real world’’’); 
see also, e.g., Michael S. Gazzaniga, The Law and Neuroscience, 60 NEURON 412--13 
(2008) (cautioning against the introduction of neuroscience-based lie detection 
evidence because jurors and judges may erroneously accept such evidence as legally 
dispositive); James R. Merikangas, Commentary: Functional MRI Lie Detection, 36 
J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 499, 501 (2008) (concluding that fMRI lie detection 
technology does not meet the Daubert criteria for courtroom testimony); Rakoff, 
supra note 17, at 40, 44 (arguing that neuroscience-based lie detection ‘‘suffers from 
several defects that would render such evidence inadmissible under [Federal Rule of 
Evidence] 702’’); Joseph R. Simpson, Functional MRI Lie Detection: Too Good to 
Be True?, 36 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 491, 493 (2008) (‘‘[H]ow well fMRI lie 
detection would work in real-life situations remains an open question.’’); Spence, 
supra note 71, at 11 (suggesting that fMRI-based lie detection is inapplicable to the 
‘‘real world’’ and lacks scientific reliability because no fMRI-based lie detection study 
has been replicated). 
 99. See infra note 151.  This Note proceeds under the strong assumption that the 
necessary improvements will be made to satisfy the requirements of scientific 
evidence under the FRE.  This assumption is necessary for my analysis under FRE 
403.  Without these technological improvements, fMRI technology will likely fail to 
be admitted under FRE 702, obviating an FRE 403 analysis. 
 100. See Mara Boundy, The Government Can Read Your Mind: Can the 
Constitution Stop It?, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 1627, 1643 (2012); Pardo, supra note 23, at 
302.  For a complete, in-depth survey of this field and a compilation of scholars’ 
assertions regarding the interplay between this technology and the Fourth and Fifth 
Amendments, see Shen, supra note 7, at 692--707. 
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various countermeasures.101  None of these problems, however, seem 
to pose a fatal threat to its legal application; the technology simply 
needs more time and funding to strengthen its clinical foundation.102 
II.  RELEVANT EVIDENTIARY RULES 
As with all evidence, this technology will be subject to the Federal 
Rules of Evidence (FRE) before it may be properly admitted in 
courts.  This Note focuses on the effects of this technology within the 
guilt phase of a criminal jury trial, although it is applicable to other 
settings as well.103  Generally, evidence must be both relevant and 
authenticated before more specific rules are applied to assess its 
admissibility.104  FRE 702 deals broadly with scientific evidence, while 
FRE 403 requires balancing the value of evidence with issues the 
evidence presents.  The relevant evidence rules, as well as the current 
evidentiary significance of both polygraph and brain imaging 
technologies, are discussed in the following sections. 
A. Rules 
1. Authentication 
fMRI images are likely to be introduced as circumstantial, 
demonstrative evidence relevant to a person’s credibility that must be 
accompanied by expert testimony.105  ‘‘fMRI provides the basis of the 
expert’s opinion by applying neuropsychological models, laws of 
physics, and statistical principles in order to draw probabilistic 
conclusions about an individual’s brain activity.’’106  To be 
authenticated, the technology must show that the general 
methodology produces an accurate result, and that the examiner 
																																																																																																																																
 101. See infra Part III.A.3 for a discussion of reliability and validity of results; see 
also, Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 892--905; Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 
229--30. 
 102. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 230. 
 103. See generally Feigenson, supra note 93; Owen D. Jones & Francis X. Shen, 
Law and Neuroscience in the United States, in INTERNATIONAL NEUROLAW: A 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 349 (Tade M. Spranger ed., 2012). 
 104. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1155. 
 105. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1156--58.  One day, fMRI images may be 
considered testimonial, such as the aforementioned ‘guilty knowledge.’ Id. at 1156.  
This would implicate the hearsay doctrine and protections against self-incrimination. 
Id. at 1156--57.  For a discussion on the Constitutional implications of fMRI 
technology, see generally Shen, supra note 7. 
 106. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1171. 
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followed the proper methodology in any particular case.107  Although 
there is no ‘‘one-size-fits-all’’ authentication process, admissibility 
procedures for fMRI will likely follow that of photographs, x-rays, 
and/or computer-generated simulations.108  Given more sophistication 
and obscure methods, each generation of imaging devices requires a 
higher degree of authentication initially before eventually becoming 
admitted on a more regular basis.109 
2. Rule 702 
FRE 702, which pertains to scientific expert testimony,110 will likely 
be the largest hurdle fMRI deception detection must pass before 
being admitted in the guilt phase of criminal jury trials.111  This Rule 
was adopted as improvement over the former Frye standard, which 
admitted scientific evidence if it could be ‘‘sufficiently established to 
have gained general acceptance in the particular field.’’112  FRE 702 
states that an expert witness may testify: (1) if his knowledge helps 
the trier of fact understand evidence; (2) if his knowledge is based on 
sufficient facts or data; (3) if his testimony is the result of reliable 
principles and methods; and (4) if he has reliably applied the 
principles and methods to the facts of the case.113 
FRE 702 was amended in the wake of the landmark Daubert 
case,114 which sanctioned trial judges as gatekeepers, empowering 
them with the responsibility to assess the scientific validity of 
evidence before its admission.115  Under Daubert, factors to be 
considered in deciding whether the methodology underlying 
proffered evidence is reliable or scientifically valid for the purposes of 
FRE 702 include: (1) the falsifiability of hypotheses and whether the 
technique used in gathering the evidence has been tested; (2) whether 
the technique has been subject to peer review; (3) whether there are 
known or potential error rates and whether there are standards 
																																																																																																																																
 107. Id. at 1164. 
 108. Id. at 1169--70. 
 109. Id. 
 110. See FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 111. For a discussion of the current technology’s admissibility under FED. R. EVID. 
702, see infra Part III.A. 
 112. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis added).  
Fourteen states still employ this standard. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1176. 
 113. FED. R. EVID. 702. 
 114. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (amended in 2000) (noting that 
the rule was ‘‘amended in response to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 
509 U.S. 579 (1993), and to the many cases applying Daubert’’). 
 115. See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
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controlling the technique’s operation; and (4) whether the technique 
has garnered general acceptance in the relevant scientific 
community.116  Although the Daubert Court did not intend for the 
factors explicated in its holding to constitute a check-list,117 they have 
since been treated as dispositive factors in determining the 
admissibility of expert testimony.118  In applying this standard in later 
cases, the Court further held that expert witnesses cannot 
unjustifiably extrapolate from an accepted premise to an unfounded 
conclusion: the data on which an expert relies must fit the facts of the 
case. 119 
Importantly, this Note initially proceeds under the assumption that 
the application of fMRI technology for deception detection purposes 
will develop its reliability enough to the point of satisfying FRE 702 
and its accompanying case law, in order to discuss the potential 
impact of another FRE that has the ability to bar this technology-----
FRE 403. 
3. Rule 403 
The second, more general, rule of evidence that may serve to 
exclude fMRI deception detection is FRE 403, which states that a 
‘‘court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: 
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue 
delay, wasting time, or needlessly presenting cumulative evidence.’’120  
This Rule is generally viewed as a low bar for admission,121 applied by 
courts ‘‘only sparingly since the evidence excluded is concededly 
probative.’’122  This application requires a court to balance the 
																																																																																																																																
 116. Id. at 593--95. 
 117. Id. at 593 (‘‘Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not presume to 
set out a definitive checklist or test.’’). 
 118. D. Michael Risinger, Goodbye to All That, or A Fool’s Errand, by One of the 
Fools: How I Stopped Worrying About Court Responses to Handwriting 
Identification (and ‘‘Forensic Science’’ in General) and Learned to Love 
Misinterpretations of Kumho Tire v. Carmichael, 43 TULSA L. REV. 447, 460 (2007). 
 119. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) (noting that judges ‘‘may 
conclude that there is simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the 
opinion proffered’’). 
 120. FED. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added); see United States v. Semrau, No. 07-
10074 Ml/P., 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010). 
 121. See 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL 
EVIDENCE § 403.02 (Joseph M. McLaughin & Matthew Bender eds., 2d ed. 1997) 
(updated LexisNexis 2013). 
 122. Spain v. Gallegos, 26 F.3d 439, 453 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing Blancha v. Raymark 
Indus., 972 F.2d 507, 516 (3d Cir. 1992)); see also John C. Bush, Warping the Rules: 
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evidence’s probative value with its various potential negative 
consequences.123  Further, the unfair prejudice that the proffered 
evidence must engender must not only outweigh its ‘‘concededly 
probative’’ value, but it must also do so substantially.124  It is 
important to note that, in our adversarial system of justice, attorneys 
purposely attempt to create prejudice to convince a neutral party of 
the strength of one’s case through proffered evidence.125  Thus, judges 
should not use this rule of evidence merely to level the playing field of 
the ‘‘relative strengths and weaknesses of cases.’’126 
B. Technology’s Evidentiary Significance 
1. The Polygraph 
fMRI technology’s prospects for successful admission have most 
often been discussed in light of the polygraph’s admissibility failure,127 
which has even been dubbed the ‘‘pyrite standard’’ of unscientific 
means to ascertain the truth.128  The admissibility of polygraph 
technology has been extensively researched and written about.129  Its 
admissibility was most notably and recently decided upon in United 
States v. Scheffer.130  The plaintiff in that case, Edward Scheffer, 
challenged the military’s ban on the use of polygraph technology in 
court-martial proceedings as a violation of his Sixth Amendment right 
to present a defense.131  The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Armed Forces reversed the court-martial conviction.132  The Supreme 
Court reversed the decision, upholding a per se ban on polygraph 
technology in military court-martial proceedings, stating that the 
																																																																																																																																
How Some Courts Misapply Generic Evidentiary Rules to Exclude Polygraph 
Evidence, 59 VAND. L. REV. 539, 559 (2006). 
 123. See Fred Galves, Where the Not-So-Wild Things Are: Computers in the 
Courtroom, the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the Need for Institutional Reform 
and More Judicial Acceptance, 13 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 161, 270 (2000). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 222. 
 126. Id. at 270. 
 127. See, e.g., Kittay, supra note 35. 
 128. Keckler, supra note 1, at 511. 
 129. See, e.g., Bush, supra note 122; Christopher Domin, Mitigating Evidence? The 
Admissibility of Polygraph Results in the Penalty Phase of a Capital Trial, 43 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 1461 (2010). 
 130. 523 U.S. 303 (1998). 
 131. Id. 
 132. United States v. Scheffer, 44 M.J. 442 (C.A.A.F. 1996). 
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government had a ‘‘legitimate interest in ensuring that reliable 
evidence is presented to the trier of fact in a criminal trial.’’133 
The Court mainly cited the lack of consensus on polygraph’s 
reliability as a basis for the legitimate interest in the ban.134  Almost 
all courts have precluded the admission of polygraph evidence, but 
there are some jurisdictions that permit its inclusion under certain 
circumstances.135  Polygraph technology also has uses outside of the 
courtroom, such as in negotiation, prosecutorial discretion, and plea 
agreements.136 
2. Brain Imaging137 
fMRI deception detection techniques have not yet been admitted 
in the criminal context.  It is widely believed that the first case to 
admit fMRI evidence whatsoever was in the sentencing phase of a 
capital punishment case; however, the judge only permitted the fMRI 
neuroscientist to describe the results of his tests, for fear that showing 
the fMRI images would over-influence the jury.138  If these techniques 
are admitted into criminal trials at all, it will most likely first occur in 
the sentencing phase of capital punishment trials, given its relaxed 
procedural standards.139 
In an fMRI deception detection case of first impression, the 
technology’s application was ruled inadmissible in the guilt phase of a 
federal criminal trial under both FRE 702 and 403 in United States v. 
																																																																																																																																
 133. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 309. 
 134. Id. at 309--12. 
 135. See Alexander, supra note 12, at 31--35; Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 412--
13. 
 136. See, e.g., Mary P. Brown & Steven E. Bunnell, Negotiating Justice: 
Prosecutorial Perspectives on Federal Plea Bargaining in the District of Columbia, 43 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1063, 1072 n.24 (2006) (mentioning the use of polygraph 
technology in the context of plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion). 
 137. See generally Jones & Shen, supra note 103, at 349 (discussing the legal use of 
brain technology in several different contexts); Pettit, Jr., supra note 55, at 334--49.  
For discussion of use of this technology in the civil context, see Jones et al., supra 
note 58, at 2 (citing O. CARTER SNEAD, NEUROIMAGING AND THE COURTS: 
STANDARD AND ILLUSTRATIVE CASE INDEX (2006)). 
 138. Virginia Hughes, Head Case, 464 NATURE 340, 341 (2010). 
 139. ‘‘Information is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules 
governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be 
excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair 
prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.’’ 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2012).  
For a comprehensive discussion of neuroimaging within the capital punishment 
context, see O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the ‘‘Complexity’’ of Capital 
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265 (2007). 
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Semrau.140  Although the magistrate judge found that this technology 
had satisfied Daubert’s falsifiability and peer review criteria,141 it was 
deemed inadmissible under FRE 702 because it failed to satisfy the 
other criteria; ‘‘real world’’ error rates were unknown,142 there was a 
lack of controlling standards in the industry,143 and the method was 
not yet generally accepted by the scientific community.144 
The court also ruled the evidence inadmissible under FRE 403 
because the tests were unilaterally conducted without informing the 
government,145 the defendant sought to admit the results to bolster his 
credibility before the jury on issues that were central to the case,146 
and the expert witness could not testify to the truthfulness of any 
specific statement made by the defendant.147  The presiding judge, 
however, admitted that the technique might one day be admissible.148  
The Sixth Circuit recently affirmed the decision.149 
III.  fMRI UNDER 403 
The criteria set forth in Daubert are useful in assessing fMRI’s 
probative value for the purposes of determining its admissibility 
under FRE 403.150  Even though this Note is premised on the 
assumption that this technology will eventually satisfy the 
admissibility standards of FRE 702 under Daubert and its progeny, it 
																																																																																																																																
 140. No. 07-10074 Ml/P., 2010 WL 6845092, at *3 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010).  fMRI 
deception detection results were also deemed inadmissible in a New York criminal 
case under the Frye standard. Wilson v. Corestaff Servs., L.P., 900 N.Y.S.2d 639, 640 
(Sup. Ct. 2010). 
 141. Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *10. 
 142. Id. at *11--12. 
 143. Id. at *13. 
 144. Id. 
 145. Id. at *4, *15--16 (noting that the defendant could have conducted the test and 
never have disclosed the results if they were not favorable). 
 146. Id. at *15. 
 147. Id. at *16 (asserting that the expert’s ability to only offer an opinion on the 
general truthfulness of answers to twenty questions as opposed to any specific 
question would cause danger of unfair prejudice that substantially outweighs any 
probative value of that opinion). 
 148. Id. at *12 n.18 (‘‘In the future, should fMRI-based lie detection undergo 
further testing, development, and peer review, improve upon standards controlling 
the technique’s operation, and gain acceptance by the scientific community for use in 
the real world, this methodology may be found to be admissible even if the error rate 
is not able to be quantified in a real world setting.’’). 
 149. United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 150. This approach was also taken in Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1179--
1206.  The probative value is determined by Daubert’s factors, which are weighed 
against FRE 403’s various concerns. 
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is necessary to understand how these factors affect its probative 
value.151  This Part will discuss each of these factors as they apply to 
fMRI technology in turn. 
A. FRE 702’s Probative Value Factors 
1. Testability 
fMRI deception detection technology has generally satisfied 
Daubert’s initial criterion: whether a technique is falsifiable and has 
been properly tested.152  Even though Semrau accepted this criterion 
as satisfied,153 others disagree, with some going as so far as saying that 
this technique is not even truly testable under ethical constraints.154  
For these critics, in order to satisfy this criterion, researchers would 
have to get participants to commit a crime and prosecute them for 
it.155  Further, the entire research field of fMRI deception detection 
consists of approximately twenty studies, only four of which test 
deception at the individual level, yielding results that are inconsistent 
with one another and that have not been replicated.156 
2. Peer Review 
fMRI technology has also generally satisfied Daubert’s second 
criterion because the  technique has been subjected to peer review 
and publication.157  However, much of the peer review is critical of the 
research: many doubt the reliability of existing results and conclusions 
due to the lack of replication of most studies.158  Not only are the 
																																																																																																																																
 151. Generally speaking, a majority of scholars that have weighed in on the 
discussion agree that, given the research to date, fMRI deception detection should 
not be admitted as substantive evidence in a court of law. See Adelsheim, supra note 
97, at 886.  For more in-depth discussion as to admissibility of deception detection 
under the current state of fMRI technology, see, e.g., id. at 905--08; Law, supra note 
86, at 37--44; Meixner, supra note 24, at 1476--87; Adam Teitcher, Note, Weaving 
Functional Brain Imaging into the Tapestry of Evidence: A Case for Functional 
Neuroimaging in Federal Criminal Courts, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 355 (2011). 
 152. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).  Falsifiability is the 
quality of being able to be proven false, which is the single most defining 
characteristic of science. Karl Popper, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE 
GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 37 (5th ed. 1989). 
 153. Semrau, 693 F.3d at 521. 
 154. See, e.g., Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 905--08; Kanwisher, supra note 90, at 
12. 
 155. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 906. 
 156. Id. at 907. 
 157. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593. 
 158. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 900--01. 
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reported results different across different labs, some researchers have 
even had difficulty replicating their own results.159  Further, many of 
the studies that support the technology’s reliability come from 
scientists with financial interests in the studies’ outcomes160-----a clear 
conflict of interest by legal standards.161 
3. Known/Potential Rate of Error 
The third factor set forth in Daubert, a technique’s known or 
potential error rate,162 is the most controversial as applied to fMRI 
technology.  Indeed, the assessment and consequential admission of 
scientific expert evidence under FRE 702 quite possibly hinges on this 
factor,163 as it most directly relates to evidential reliability.164  
Proponents assert that fMRI technology can accurately distinguish an 
individual subject’s truthful response from a lie anywhere from 
seventy-six percent in one study165 to ninety percent in another.166  
However, critics are quick to point out many faults of the technology 
and its application in those experiments. 
The first set of problems this technology presents with regard to 
error rates concerns its scientific validity: ‘‘does the principle support 
																																																																																																																																
 159. See infra notes 187--96 and accompanying text for a discussion on reliability. 
 160. Jane C. Moriarty, Visions of Deception: Neuroimages and the Search for 
Truth, 42 AKRON L. REV. 739, 759 (2009). 
 161. Several scientists who claim that the technology has successfully attained a 
high level of accuracy are financially tied to its success. See Schauer, supra note 74, at 
1202 n.53 (‘‘For example, Christos Davatzikos, the lead researcher of the Davatzikos 
study . . . serves on the Science Board of No Lie MRI . . . . Similarly, Frank Kozel, the 
lead researcher of the three Kozel studies . . . serves as a scientific advisor for 
Cephos . . . . Finally, No Lie MRI uses technology and methods under a license from 
Daniel Langleben, lead researcher on many other studies . . . .’’). 
 162. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 163. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, at 9. 
 164. ‘‘In a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based 
upon scientific validity.’’ Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9 (noting ‘‘that scientists typically 
distinguish between ‘validity’ . . . and ‘reliability’’’).  The term ‘‘reliability’’ has similar 
but distinct meanings in science and the law. See Schauer, supra note 74.  Scientific 
reliability is defined as having reproducible results. See Law, supra note 86, at 42.  
Legal reliability is having the quality of ‘‘trustworthiness.’’ Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 
n.9. 
 165. Langleben et al., Telling Truth, supra note 74, at 271 (concluding that fMRI 
images may be able to distinguish a truth from a lie on the basis that a lie ‘‘appears to 
be a more working memory-intensive activity, characterized by increased activation 
of the inferolateral cortex implicated in response selection, inhibition, and 
generation’’). 
 166. Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 74, at 611 (concluding that 
‘‘fMRI can be used to detect deception within a cooperative individual’’); see also, 
Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 223. 
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what it purports to show?’’167  One subset of scientific validity 
problems comes from external and ecological validity168: extrapolating 
results from a small number of test subjects to larger populations of 
people,169 from the laboratory to the real world.170  There is a 
fundamental difference in the foci of science and criminal law171: 
science is mainly concerned with population-level characteristics, 
while criminal law focuses mostly on the individual.172  Due to the 
prohibitive cost of each scan,173 most studies and experiments done 
with fMRI technology are done with a small number of subjects.174  
																																																																																																																																
 167. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n.9. 
 168. Although ecological and external validity are similar to each other and 
sometimes interchangeably used, they are scientifically distinct concepts. Francis X. 
Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths, Proofs, Lies, and Lessons, 
62 MERCER L. REV. 861, 876--77 (2011). 
 169. External validity is a measure of how much the experimental results can be 
applied to the general population or individual of interest. Id.  Concerns with the 
external validity of most social science research, a concern not unique to deception 
detection research, has to do with the scientific construction of ‘‘normal.’’ Brown & 
Murphy, supra note 48, at 1149--51 (asserting that the group data to which an 
individual is compared may not necessarily be ‘‘normal’’ and ‘‘[e]ven cutting-edge 
science has a crude idea of what ‘normal’ means as captured by group data’’); Sydney 
B. Roth, The Emergence of Neuroscience Evidence in Louisiana, 87 TUL. L. REV. 
197, 215 (2012) (‘‘Being in a certain category of individuals, who might on average be 
more (or less) susceptible to a certain outcome, does not necessarily mean that 
everyone in that group of individuals is more (or less) likely to experience that 
particular outcome.’’). 
 170. Ecological validity is a measure of how much experimental laboratory 
conditions mirror the real world environment. Shen & Jones, supra note 168, at 876.  
One scholar suggests that there might simply be ‘‘too great an analytical gap between 
the data and the opinion proffered’’ for laboratory deception detection to ever be 
applicable to real world lying. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 902 (quoting Gen. Elec. 
Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)). 
 171. See generally Schauer, supra note 74 (discussing many of the differences 
between science and the law). 
 172. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1182--83; David L. Faigman, A 
Preliminary Exploration of the Problem of Reasoning From General Scientific Data 
to Individualized Legal Decision-Making, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1115 (2010) (quoting 
DAVID L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE 
LAW 69 (1999)) (‘‘[W]hile science attempts to discover the universals hiding among 
the particulars, trial courts attempt to discover the particulars hiding among the 
universals.’’); Jones & Shen, supra note 103, at 356.  For discussion of the use of 
epidemiological data in proving causation, see Schauer, supra note 83, at 27 n.59. 
 173. As of 2009, two private companies, No Lie MRI and Cephos, offered fMRI 
deception detection services at the cost of $4000 to $5000 per scan. See Henry T. 
Greely, Law and the Revolution in Neuroscience: An Early Look at the Field, 42 
AKRON L. REV. 687, 698 (2009). 
 174. See United States v. Semrau, No. 07--10074 Ml/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *11 
(W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010); Gerard, supra note 20, at 28; Greely & Illes, supra note 
52, at 403 (surveying all published fMRI lie detection research through 2006); 
Schauer, supra note 74, at 1201.  As of this publication, the largest subject group in 
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Within these small sample sizes, there is very little cross-cultural 
variation among the test subjects.175  Indeed, many of the test subjects 
in these studies are healthy, upper/middle-class, white, right-handed, 
male young adults,176 usually in undergraduate institutions.177  Further, 
these non-diverse groups of test subjects often volunteer for these 
studies, usually receiving class credit or financial compensation for 
their participation.178  Most of these experiments focus on detecting 
deception within the larger group of subjects, as opposed to 
comparing a single individual’s responses, or those between 
individuals.179 
																																																																																																																																
any peer-reviewed fMRI deception detection article was fifty-two subjects. See Lee et 
al., Neural Correlates of Feigned Memory Impairment, 28 NEUROIMAGE 305--13 
(2005).  However, most experiments were conducted with fewer than thirty subjects. 
See Spence, supra note 71, at 14--21 (surveying peer-reviewed lie detection research 
through 2007). 
 175. Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *12; Tommaso Bruni, Cross-Cultural Variation 
and fMRI Lie-Detection, in TECHNOLOGIES ON THE STAND: LEGAL AND ETHICAL 
QUESTIONS IN NEUROSCIENCE AND ROBOTICS 137, 140 (B. Van den Berg & L. 
Klaming eds., 2011), available at http://arno.uvt.nl/show.cgi?fid=114416; Greely & 
Illes, supra note 52, at 403 (stating that fMRI lie detection studies through 2006 had 
little gender or ethnic diversity). 
 176. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 899; see Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 403 
(discussing the importance of conducting experiments on representative samples).  
fMRI deception detection research must be conducted on specific sub-populations in 
order to increase its external validity, including pathological liars, mentally retarded 
individuals, environmentally damaged individuals, and those with neurodegenerative 
diseases. See Reese, supra note 2, at 219--27. 
 177. Joel D. Lieberman et al., Preface to ‘‘When Does Sample Matter in Juror 
Decision-Making Research? Differences Between College Student and 
Representative Samples of Jurors,’’ 29 BEHAV. SCI. L. 325, 325--26 (2011) (discussing 
the applicability of research conducted on college students to the general 
population).  Few significant differences between college student and representative 
samples have been found. Id.  Several behavioral research studies generally conclude 
that ‘‘well-designed experiments using subject pools with low incentives can be 
reliable in predicting the behavior of people in general in real-world situations.’’ 
Schauer, supra note 83 (manuscript at 24).  Further, concerns about the applicability 
of studies that solely use undergraduates as test subjects is not unique to fMRI 
experiments, as most behavioral studies utilize the same populations. Id. at 23. 
 178. See Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *12; Craig A. Anderson, Research in the 
Psychological Laboratory: Truth or Triviality?, 8 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. 
SCI. 3, 7 (1999) (asserting that using only undergraduates in experiments limits 
individual differences, which in turn can exacerbate problems with both internal 
validity and external reliability); Schauer, supra note 74, at 1207. 
 179. As of this publication, only four out of approximately twenty known fMRI lie 
detection experiments have been conducted at the individual level. See, e.g., 
Davatzikos et al., supra note 74, at 663; Kozel et al., Detecting Deception, supra note 
74, at 611; Kozel et al., Pilot Study, supra note 74, at 303; Langleben et al., Telling 
Truth, supra note 74, at 262.  For the importance of distinguishing results on the 
individual level from the group or population level, see Greely & Illes, supra note 52, 
at 402. 
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A separate but related subset of scientific validity problems stem 
from the manner in which these experiments are set up, which is 
called construct validity.  Construct validity is the idea that an 
experiment actually measures what it purports to measure.180  The 
largest problem for fMRI is related to the aforementioned incentive 
problem: those who volunteer for the studies have a different, and 
substantially lesser, motivation to lie than criminals who would be 
criminally investigated with this technology.181  Almost all of the 
studies that analyze deception have been conducted in controlled 
laboratory settings, where the results would undoubtedly be more 
accurate.182  No research has been done during actual criminal activity 
or its ensuing investigation,183 mainly due to physical and ethical 
constraints.184  Some critics even attack the construct validity of many 
of these experiments on the grounds that test subjects only lie when 
instructed to do so, which, they contend, is different than a real lie.185  
																																																																																																																																
 180. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1201. 
 181. See Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092, at *12 (‘‘Many studies entail little motivation 
or jeopardy at all, while the motivation (e.g. $50 for successful deception) or jeopardy 
(revealing personal autobiographical information) in other studies is not equivalent 
to what would be at stake in real applications.’’) (citations omitted). 
 182. Id. 
 183. David P. McCabe et. al., The Influence of fMRI Lie Detection Evidence on 
Juror Decision-Making, 29 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 566, 567 (2011). 
 184. Kanwisher, supra note 90, at 12.  One ethical constraint is that, in order to 
truly test the veracity of this technology’s results, experimenters would have to 
actually know of the commission of a crime and test the criminal before such 
technology would be permitted as evidence.  This creates an ethical dilemma because 
the experimenters have knowledge of a crime, but would not be permitted to testify 
to the results in order to conduct clinical trials in fMRI’s application to deception 
detection. See, e.g., Hakun et al., supra note 75, at 519.  One physical constraint is the 
fact that this technology has not been installed in any police precinct due to its 
prohibitive cost and size, so alleged criminals would have to be transported to and 
from a laboratory with all the necessary safety precautions that come along with such 
transportation. 
 185. Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 404 (‘‘Are lies about participation in a crime 
the same as lies about the quality of a meal or the existence of a ‘prior engagement’?  
Do lies about sex activate the same regions of the brain as lies about money, lies to 
avoid embarrassment, or lies about the five of clubs?  Do lies of omission look the 
same under fMRI as lies of commission?’’); Kamila E. Sip et al., Detecting 
Deception: The Scope and Limits, 12 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 48, 50--51 (2008) 
(arguing that most of these studies have only shown ‘‘instructed lies’’ and not real 
deception); cf. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1201, 1208 (arguing that even though the 
difference between instructed lies and real lies poses a ‘‘significant construct validity 
problem,’’ the results of these experiments would be completely valueless ‘‘only if 
there were no correlation at all between causes of the brain activity involved in the 
real lie and those involved in the instructed lie.’’); Schauer, supra note 83 (manuscript 
at 25. But see, e.g., Joshua D. Greene & Joseph M. Paxton, Patterns of Neural 
Activity Associated with Honest and Dishonest Moral Decisions, 106 PROC. NAT’L 
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Further, while not as vulnerable as polygraph technology, some 
evidence suggests that fMRI technology is still susceptible to 
countermeasures.186 
A distinct set of problems with regard to fMRI’s known error rate 
is its reliability,187 which is defined as having reproducible results.188  
For lie detection, this entails having the same neurological regions 
activated by lies to the same question, in four different contexts: (1) 
by individuals within a single experimental session; (2) by the same 
individual among different experimental sessions; (3) among different 
individuals in the same experimental session; and (4) among different 
individuals in different experimental sessions.189  Only a handful of 
studies attempt to discern lies at the individual level; the majority 
average responses from a group of subjects.190  Most lie detection 
studies have not yet been replicated,191 and some replication attempts 
have even turned up completely contrary results.192  Further, 
experimenters in this field use different research paradigms, so their 
results may not apply to one another’s’ research.193  One scholar 
argues that the law might be better served by having different 
reliability standards for evidential admissibility, based on the 
purposes of the evidence.194  In this hypothetical regime, a principle 
																																																																																																																																
ACAD. SCI. 12506, 12506 (2009) (describing a study involving genuine dishonesty with 
subject choice); Spence et al., Speaking of Secrets, supra note 74, at 1411 (conducting 
a study allowing test subjects to choose when to lie to protect against the potential 
confounding variable of results reflecting subjects performing instructed actions). 
 186. Ganis et al., supra note 90, at 312 (experimental results showing that subjects 
can be trained to confound deception detection).  In an experiment that involved 
deceptively answering questions with their fingers, countermeasures included: ‘‘to 
move imperceptibly (i.e., without any overt movement that could be observed) the 
left index finger, the middle left finger, and the left toe.’’ Id. at 313. 
 187. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 n.9 (1993). (‘‘[D]oes 
application of the principle produce consistent results?’’)  The Daubert Court may 
have originally intended for this criterion to be left out of admissibility 
determinations of scientific evidence, specifically stating that ‘‘evidentiary reliability 
will be based upon scientific validity,’’ despite first acknowledging that validity and 
reliability were two distinct, albeit similar, concepts. Id. 
 188. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 229. 
 189. Id.  A single experimental session would be a group of individuals being a part 
of an experiment at the same time, in the same place, while different sessions would 
occur at different times, and possibly in different places. Id. 
 190. See Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 402. 
 191. Id. (‘‘A good rule of thumb is to never believe a result until at least one 
investigator from outside the original group confirms it.  Lie detection through fMRI 
does not pass this test.’’); Spence, supra note 71, at 24. 
 192. Spence, supra note 71, at 24. 
 193. Id. at 13. 
 194. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1205. 
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piece of evidence that will be used as a cornerstone of a party’s case 
would be subject to a higher bar of reliability before admission.195  On 
the other hand, if proffered evidence is just a ‘‘piece of the puzzle,’’ 
then it should be subject to lower standards because a ‘‘brick is not a 
wall.’’196 
4. Existence/Maintenance of Standards 
fMRI has probably not satisfied the next Daubert criterion,197 
which is the existence and maintenance of standards controlling a 
technique’s operation.198  As previously mentioned, fMRI technology 
only shows the movement of deoxygenated blood throughout the 
brain: this movement still requires much interpretation as to what 
may properly be deduced.199  At least one critic points out that there is 
currently little consistency or transparency as to the standards in this 
field, or, at the least, that the standards are manipulable.200  Even 
though fMRI results are less susceptible to subjective interpretation, 
researchers exercise subjective discretion in creating the results 
themselves.201 
5. General Acceptance in the Scientific Community 
While the scientific community generally has accepted the use of 
fMRI technology, courts have held that its use for lie detection 
																																																																																																																																
 195. Id. at 1205 n.77 (asserting that higher standards of reliability should be shown 
when evidence such as DNA identification principally determines whether a 
defendant goes to jail). 
 196. Id. (quoting 1 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 185, at 729 (Kenneth S. Broun ed., 
6th ed. 2006) (analogizing each piece of evidence to a brick in a wall that a defendant 
tries to build in his defense)). 
 197. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 908 (‘‘[T]here simply are no standard techniques 
at this time.’’). 
 198. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 594 (1993). 
 199. See Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 888--95, 908 (discussing BOLD fMRI and its 
inherent weaknesses); Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1138--41, 1188 (discussing 
the various layers along the chain of inferences that must be made in order to create 
an fMRI image and deduce conclusions from it). 
 200. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1153 (‘‘Statistical thresholds can therefore 
be manipulated . . . . If a party does not like the results that are shown at a certain 
level of zoom, simply altering the statistical precision may provide a more compelling 
image for one’s legal argument.’’); Law, supra note 86, at 54 (musing that a proponent 
can pay an expert to ‘‘find’’ certain results by ‘‘simply adjusting the statistical 
thresholds or the baseline task’’). 
 201. Brown & Murphy, supra note 48, at 1195 (analogizing fMRI images to 
paintings instead of photographs, since ‘‘[u]nlike photographs, the visual properties of 
functional brain images are instantiated by the use of texture, shading, perspective, 
and color’’). 
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purposes fails the last Daubert criterion of admissibility.202  While 
some researchers think that it has reached this level,203 others believe 
that there should be a moratorium on all non-research use of this 
fMRI deception detection technology until standards can be 
established and the field regulated.204  Still others question why the 
law is using scientific norms and standards to govern the legal realm 
at all.205  Broadly speaking, there is little general acceptance within the 
small field of fMRI deception detection researchers, much less the 
entire scientific community.206  One researcher, who even holds a 
patent for this technique and stands to financially profit from its 
success, has publicly stated that it is not yet ready for deployment in 
the real world.207 
B. Unfair Prejudice: Will the Jury Overvalue This Evidence? 
The first factor that must be weighed against the potential 
probative value of fMRI technology is its potential for unfair 
prejudice.208  Relevant and probative evidence can be barred from 
admission if the jury would accord such evidence with weight 
disproportionate to its objective value.209  Fear of jury overvaluation 
lies at the heart of much of the exclusion of admittedly relevant 
evidence, especially expert testimony.210  However, evidence shows 
that people do not overvalue neuroscientific images.211  On the other 
hand, jurors have been shown in fact to overvalue other types of 
evidence that are heavily relied upon, especially eyewitness testimony 
and forensic individualization (including DNA profiling).212  This Part 
examines jurors’ views of this technology in more depth. 
																																																																																																																																
 202. United States v. Semrau, No. 07--10074 Ml/P, 2010 WL 6845092, at *13 (W.D. 
Tenn. June 1, 2010); see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. 
 203. See, e.g., Teitcher, supra note 151, at 366. 
 204. See Greely & Illes, supra note 52, at 413. 
 205. See generally Schauer, supra note 74, at 1191, 1202--09; Schauer & Spellman, 
supra note 5. 
 206. Adelsheim, supra note 97, at 908. 
 207. Id. at 905--06, 908 (citing Moriarty, supra note 160, at 748). 
 208. FED. R. EVID. 403. 
 209. Richard D. Friedman, Minimizing the Jury Over-Valuation Concern, 2003 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 967, 968. 
 210. See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, at 5. 
 211. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 212. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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1. Jurors Will Not Overvalue Neuroimaging Evidence 
Initial scholarship gave credence to the idea that people were 
overly swayed by neuroscientific explanations and imagery.213  Those 
who claim that neuroscientific evidence would have an undue 
influence on jury members pointed to a ‘‘Christmas tree 
phenomenon,’’214 in that juries would be excessively persuaded by 
such images because they would be presented in the form of beautiful 
graphs with many bright colors.215  These claims began even before 
the advent of fMRI technology.216  Several studies outlined below 
have attempted to show how fMRI imaging would engender unfair 
prejudice.  Almost all of these studies, however, suffer from various 
external and construct validity problems,217 and none of them found 
the undue prejudice they sought. 
a. Gurley & Marcus (2008) 
An early study, conducted by Jessica R. Gurley and David K. 
Marcus, contended that jurors were more likely to return a result of 
‘‘not guilty by reason of insanity’’ when presented with structural 
images of brain damage to defendants.218  There are several reasons 
why this study is not applicable to fMRI lie detection.  First, the 
experiment uses structural images, which depicts the brain at rest,219 
as opposed to the functional time-lapse images that fMRI provides 
when subjecting subjects to tasks, which is the subject of this Note.  
Second, the experiment failed to dissociate the brain images from the 
																																																																																																																																
 213. See, e.g., Joseph Dumit, Objective Brains, Prejudicial Images, 12 SCI. 
CONTEXT 173 (1999). 
 214. Dean Mobbs et al., Law, Responsibility, and the Brain, 5 PUB. LIBR. SCI. 
BIOLOGY 0693, 0699 (2007), available at http://www.plosbiology.org/article/ 
fetchObject.action?uri=info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pbio.0050103&represent
ation=PDF. 
 215. Kevin Davis, Brain Trials: Neuroscience Is Taking a Stand in the Courtroom, 
A.B.A. J. (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/brain_trials_ 
neuroscience_is_taking_a_stand_in_the_courtroom; see also Gerard, supra note 20, 
at 28--29. 
 216. Dumit, supra note 213, at 175, 180, 187 (discussing images created by 
computerized tomography (CT) and positron emission tomography (PET)). 
 217. For a discussion on external and construct validity, see supra notes 168--94 and 
accompanying text. 
 218. Jessica R. Gurley & David K. Marcus, The Effects of Neuroimaging and Brain 
Injury on Insanity Defenses, 26 BEHAV. SCI. L. 85, 93 (2008). 
 219. McCabe et al., supra note 183, at 568. 
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expert testimony;220 thus, the question of whether it was the testimony 
or the images that produced the effect cannot be determined.221 
b. Weisberg et al. (2008) 
Another study, conducted by Deena S. Weisberg et al., asserted 
that people were more likely to believe explanations of events when 
they included neuroscientific language than the same explanations 
without such language.222  However, the authors themselves 
recognized the major limitation of their findings, stating, ‘‘people may 
be responding to some more general property of the neuroscience 
information.’’223  Most importantly, this study did not even measure 
the effect of brain images.224  Further, subjects were not tested in a 
legal setting.225 
c. McCabe & Castel (2008) 
A third study, conducted by David P. McCabe and Alan D. Castel, 
argued that neuroscientific explanations were more influential when 
accompanied by brain images than when accompanied by bar 
graphs.226  There were several problems with these results.  First, 
subjects were asked to compare articles with brain images in each part 
of the experiment; there was no control condition in which a subject 
was asked to evaluate the article without a brain image altogether.227  
																																																																																																																																
 220. Adina L. Roskies et al., Neuroimages in Court: Less Biasing than Feared, 17 
TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 99, 99 (2013), available at http://download.cell.com/ 
trends/cognitive-sciences/pdf/PIIS1364661313000223.pdf?intermediate=true. 
 221. Id. (citing N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, Neuroimage Evidence and the 
Insanity Defense, 29 BEHAV. SCI. L. 592, 596--97 (2011)); N.J. Schweitzer et al., 
Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense: No Impact, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 357, 361 (2011) [hereinafter Schweitzer et al., No Impact] (stating that the 
experiments ‘‘confounded the presentation of neuroimagery with additional verbal 
testimony’’). 
 222. Deena S. Weisberg et al., The Seductive Allure of Neuroscience Explanations, 
20 J. COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE 470, 476 (2008). 
 223. Id. 
 224. Martha J. Farah & Cayce J. Hook, The Seductive Allure of ‘‘Seductive 
Allure,’’ 8 PERSP. PSYCHOL. SCI. 88, 89 (2013); Roskies et al., supra note 220, at 99; 
Schweitzer et al., No Impact, supra note 221, at 361. 
 225. Roskies et al., supra note 220, at 99; Schweitzer et al., No Impact, supra note 
221, at 360. 
 226. David P. McCabe & Alan D. Castel, Seeing Is Believing: The Effect of Brain 
Images on Judgments of Scientific Reasoning, 107 COGNITION 343 (2008). 
 227. Robert B. Michael et al., On the (Non)persuasive Power of a Brain Image, 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. REV. (Feb. 2013), http://www.researchgate.net/publication/ 
235523242_On_the_(non)persuasive_power_of_a_brain_image.  A growing body of 
evidence suggests that any kind of image increases probative value of accompanying 
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Second, much like the pitfall in the Gurley and Marcus study, the 
neuroscience language contained in the study likely already 
influenced subjects;228 this Note is concerned with the effect of 
imaging.  Moreover, critics argue that the images themselves weren’t 
equivalent to each other.229  Additionally, this experiment was not 
conducted in a legal setting.230  Perhaps most importantly, when the 
raw data from this experiment and an attempted replication of it were 
combined, other researchers suggested that McCabe and Castel’s 
purported conclusions were unsubstantiated.231  That is, when other 
experimenters attempted to replicate the study’s results, they instead 
found that the brain image exerted ‘‘little to no independent influence 
on juror verdicts.’’232 
d. McCabe et al. (2011) 
A fourth study, conducted by David P. McCabe et al., suggested 
that verbally offered fMRI lie detection evidence was more influential 
than lie detection evidence yielded from polygraph or thermal facial 
imaging technology offered in the same form.233  This experiment’s 
major shortcoming is that it fails to compare the effect of such verbal 
evidence with the effect of neuroimages234: verbal neuroscientific 
evidence is already permissible from expert witnesses in criminal 
cases.235  Much like the limitation of the Weisberg et al. experiment, 
this study does not measure the effect of fMRI imaging.  Of further 
note, this influence was negated when the technology’s scientific 
																																																																																																																																
propositions. See Feigenson, supra note 93, at 233 (discussing the inflation of 
probative value enjoyed by all visual images). See generally Lucille A. Jewel, 
Through A Glass Darkly: Using Brain Science and Visual Rhetoric to Gain a 
Professional Perspective on Visual Advocacy, 19 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 237, 245 
(2010) (discussing the advantages of visual advocacy). 
 228. See Michael et al., supra note 227. 
 229. Farah & Hook, supra note 224, at 88 (stating that it was ‘‘not strictly true’’ that 
the illustrations used in these two conditions were ‘‘informationally equivalent’’). 
 230. See Roskies et al., supra note 220, at 1; see also Schweitzer et al., No Impact, 
supra note 221, at 361 (‘‘[J]udgments of the participants in these experiments [were] 
made without the competing overlay of crime-guilt-punishment.’’). 
 231. Michael et al., supra note 227, at 2.  The compilation of raw data from 
identical, yet separately conducted, experiments is called a ‘‘meta-analysis.’’ Meixner, 
supra note 24, at 1466 n.107. 
 232. Michael et al., supra note 227, at 5. 
 233. See McCabe et al., supra note 183, at 574 (2011) (stating additionally that fact 
patterns containing fMRI lie detection evidence was more influential than fact 
patterns without any such evidence). 
 234. See id. at 571. 
 235. See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the ‘‘Complexity’’ of Capital 
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1272 (2007). 
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validity was called into question within the experiment’s fact 
pattern.236 
e. Greene & Cahill (2012) 
Another study, conducted by Edith Greene and Brian S. Cahill, 
argued that mock jurors were less likely to recommend a sentence of 
death for defendants at high risk of future dangerousness when given 
neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence than when they were 
given neither.237  However, visual representations of brain 
abnormalities did not have a more profound impact on jurors’ 
decisions than neuropsychological testing results alone.238  The 
authors suggested that any additional information may have affected 
the jurors decisions.239  According to these scholars, ‘‘[w]hen [brain 
scans] do have an impact . . . it is no greater than the impact of 
neuropsychological testing data that have been available for many 
decades.’’240 
f. Schweitzer et al. (2011) 
The most compelling study exploring the undue influence of 
neuroimagery found that neuroimagery did not affect jurors’ 
judgments any more than verbal neuroscience-based testimony.241  
Several scholars understood the shortcomings of the aforementioned 
experiments, and undertook to try to expand or replicate them.242  
The four experiments within the study were designed to account for 
all of the variables that may have confounded the results of the 
aforementioned studies.243  ‘‘In each successive experiment[,] the 
																																																																																																																																
 236. See McCabe et al., supra note 183, at 574.  See infra Part III.C.5 for a 
discussion on cross-examination and its effects. 
 237. See Edith Greene & Brian S. Cahill, Effects of Neuroimaging Evidence on 
Mock Juror Decision Making, 30 BEHAV. SCI. L. 280, 293 (2012). 
 238. See id. 
 239. See id. (‘‘It may be that any additional information pertinent to the 
defendant’s physical and emotional disposition has the effect of personalizing him to 
jurors and enhancing their impressions of him . . . .’’). 
 240. Id. at 294 (emphasis added); see also Schauer, supra note 83, (manuscript at 
37--38) (‘‘The precise question to be asked about fMRI evidence therefore, 
is . . . whether the inflated value they produce is greater than the inflated value 
produced by the visual evidence that the legal system routinely admits.’’).	
 241. See Schweitzer et al., No Impact, supra note 221. 
 242. See Law, supra note 86, at 53 (‘‘When the general population relies on 
primary experimental findings rather than review articles and textbook knowledge, 
scientists must become proactive.’’). 
 243. See Schweitzer et al., No Impact, supra note 221, at 365 (describing the study’s 
numerous control conditions).  Experimenters conducted the experiments in a legal 
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pressures on mock jurors to find guilt [were reduced] (thus potentially 
liberating them to be increasingly open to influence from the 
neuroimage evidence).’’244  Even though most of the authors of this 
study expected these images to unduly influence the mock jurors,245 
they concluded, ‘‘neuroimages had no especially potent or consistent 
impact on verdicts or sentences.’’246  Describing this turn of events, 
another scholar stated, ‘‘[g]iven the visual appeal of images and their 
high-tech origins, the idea that they are inordinately persuasive is 
plausible.  This a priori plausibility may have reduced scrutiny of the 
experimental designs and results that seem to support it.’’247 
2. Jurors Currently Overvalue Other Types of Evidence 
Jurors currently ascribe more weight than they should to certain 
kinds of admissible evidence based on that evidence’s lack of 
objective value.  As explained in the sections below, eyewitness 
testimony is notoriously unreliable, and yet it is continuously 
admitted, and strongly relied upon by jurors.  Jurors also award 
excessive weight to forensic evidence, such as fingerprint and DNA 
evidence. 
a. Eyewitness Testimony 
Empirical research has effectively established that eyewitness 
testimony is unreliable.248  Humans have limited cognitive capacities 
																																																																																																																																
setting. See id.  The ‘‘neuroimage condition,’’ where a subject would be shown a brain 
scan as well as having it described by accompanying testimony based on the brain 
scan, was compared to various other control groups: (1) one group hearing the 
identical neuroscience expert testimony accompanied by a graphical depiction of the 
defendant’s brain function; (2) one group hearing the identical neuroscience expert 
testimony accompanied by a generic image of an empty courtroom; (3) one group 
hearing an expert witness’ testimony that had the same substantive conclusions and 
diagnoses as the previous group, but which was based on non-neuroimaging 
techniques; (4) one group hearing the expert witness testimony of a clinical 
psychologist; and (5) the control group, with the absence of expert testimony 
altogether. Id. 
 244. Id. at 387. 
 245. See id. at 388. 
 246. Id. at 387. 
 247. Farah & Hook, supra note 224, at 89 (asserting that the cognitive heuristic of 
‘‘confirmation bias’’ may have clouded some experimenters’ judgments and 
conclusions). 
 248. See Richard S. Schmechel et al., Beyond the Ken? Testing Jurors’ 
Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS 177, 179 (2006) 
(citing Saul Kassin et al., On the ‘‘General Acceptance’’ of Eyewitness Testimony 
Research: A New Survey of the Experts, 56 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 405, 413--14 (2001)) 
(asserting that a 2001 survey of established eyewitness researchers found nearly 
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and are subject to biases and limitations,249 including, importantly, 
those of memory and perception,250 which lead them to be poor 
eyewitnesses.251  Among other findings, studies have shown that 
human memory is malleable and rather ephemeral;252 people are far 
better at recognizing the faces of people in their own race than they 
are those of a different race,253 and a witness’ confidence has little to 
no correlation with the accuracy of his or her testimony.254 
Jurors have very little awareness of these findings, despite the fact 
that they have been widely established for some period of time.255  
Perhaps most importantly, most people have very little understanding 
of the stages and faults of human memory storage and recall,256 
leading them to grossly overestimate a witness’ ability to retain 
memories.257  Even judges and attorneys themselves are not 
completely familiar with the shortcomings of eyewitness testimony.258 
																																																																																																																																
unanimously that several findings of eyewitness testimony deficiencies were reliable 
and established in scientific literature). 
 249. See Chris W. Sanchirico, ‘‘What Makes the Engine Go?’’ Cognitive 
Limitations and Cross-Examination, 14 WIDENER L. REV. 507, 510 n.10 (citing over 
twenty empirical studies and articles that point out how various cognitive limitations 
and biases cause people to be poor witnesses). 
 250. See Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, at 12, nn.40, 42--43 (citing many 
sources that point to the fact that witness perception is poor and not nearly as reliable 
as most people believe). 
 251. See id. (asserting that the shortcomings in perception and memory may 
contribute to the negative effects). 
 252. See generally Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert 
Testimony on the Unreliability of Eyewitness Testimony, 2007 FED. CTS. L. REV. 3 
(2007); see also Jacob L. Zerkle, I Never Forget A Face: New Jersey Sets the 
Standard in Eyewitness Identification Reform, 47 VAL. U. L. REV. 357 (2012). 
 253. See Tara Anthony et al., Cross-Racial Facial Identification: A Social 
Cognitive Integration, 18 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 296 (1992). 
 254. See Jennifer L. Overbeck, Beyond Admissibility: A Practical Look At the Use 
of Eyewitness Expert Testimony in the Federal Courts, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1895, 
1900--01 (2005).  Other findings include: (1) stressful situations reduce a person’s 
ability to successfully recall facial details; (2) witnesses overestimate how long it took 
for an event to unfold; and (3) the presentation format affects recall ability because a 
person is more likely to misidentify a defendant if he is presented in a group. See 
Schmechel et al., supra note 250, at 178. 
 255. See Schmechel et al., supra note 248, at 192. 
 256. See generally Fradella, supra note 252; Zerkle, supra note 252. 
 257. See Overbeck, supra note 254, at 1904.  This is especially true when 
eyewitnesses display confidence in their memory. See Schauer & Spellman, supra 
note 5. 
 258. See Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, A Survey of Judges’ Knowledge and 
Beliefs About Eyewitness Testimony, 40 CT. REV. 6, 9 (2003) (showing that two-
thirds of judges surveyed gave incorrect answers for three out of six questions that 
assess understanding of the link between eyewitness confidence and accuracy). 
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Given the shortcomings in eyewitness testimony, and the lack of 
general awareness of those shortcomings, jurors tend to overvalue the 
intrinsic worth of such evidence.259  Jurors place more weight on 
eyewitness testimony than on other types of evidence, and are 
substantially more likely to convict defendants when they hear such 
testimony than when none is available.260  Before the development of 
forensic DNA testing, mistaken eyewitness identifications were 
responsible for the convictions of more innocent persons than any 
other combination of factors.261  More recent studies of conviction 
reversals due to DNA testing indicate that a significant percentage of 
these reversals involved an eyewitness identification that turned out 
to false262-----in some studies, as much as eighty-five percent263-----
making eyewitness testimony the ‘‘single greatest cause of wrongful 
convictions in this country.’’264  For this reason, courts have 
increasingly permitted expert testimony that addresses the inaccuracy 
of eyewitness testimony, human memory, and false confessions.265 
b. Forensic Evidence 
Forensic science is continuously admitted under Daubert and FRE 
702 with very little hesitation, despite its deficiencies and lack of 
																																																																																																																																
 259. See Overbeck, supra note 254, at 1903--04; Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, 
at 28; Schmechel et al., supra note 248, at 193--204 (citing a study that showed a 
substantial majority of a thousand-person jury pool in the District of Columbia 
lacked a meaningful understanding of eyewitness deficiencies and overestimated the 
value of eyewitness testimony as a result). 
 260. See Overbeck, supra note 254, at 1897--98. 
 261. See Jacqueline McMurtrie, The Role of the Social Sciences in Preventing 
Wrongful Convictions, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1271, 1275 n.18 (2005) (citing several 
studies of wrongful convictions that suggested that a majority of them involved false 
eyewitness testimony). 
 262. See Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 60 
(2008) (stating that seventy-nine percent of the first 200 people exonerated by post-
conviction DNA testing were convicted using incorrect eyewitness testimony); see 
also Overbeck, supra note 254, at 1896 n.2 (citing studies that showed that two-thirds 
of total exonerations were in cases where convictions were based at least in part on 
faulty eyewitness identifications). 
 263. See Wes R. Porter, Repeating, Yet Evading Review: Admitting Reliable 
Expert Testimony in Criminal Cases Still Depends Upon Who Is Asking, 36 
RUTGERS L. REC. 48, 52 n.28 (2009) (citing McMurtrie, supra note 261, at 1275 n.17) 
(asserting that false eyewitness testimony accounted for as much as eighty-five 
percent of convictions later exonerated by DNA testing). 
 264. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 738 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., 
dissenting) (citing State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 886 (N.J. 2011)). 
 265. See Pardo, supra note 23, at 318; see also Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, at 
13. See generally Schmechel et al., supra note 250, at 178 (discussing various legal 
trends that have contributed to reforms in the use of eyewitness identification). 
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scientific validity.266  Forensic individualization methods, most notably 
fingerprint and DNA analysis, rely on statistic probabilities and 
subjects’ individuality in order to match a piece of evidence with its 
origin.267  DNA typing was recognized as a large breakthrough for 
criminal investigation immediately after its advent in the 1980s268: 
some scholars have even asserted that DNA typing technology paved 
the way for the Daubert decision’s overhaul in expert witness 
testimony admissibility standards.269  Ironically, even though 
proponents of DNA technology assert that fingerprinting is currently 
more reliable than DNA,270 some scholars assert that fingerprinting 
technology might be deemed inadmissible if its admission were sought 
under the current Daubert standard.271  Accordingly, DNA evidence 
is now touted as the ‘‘gold standard’’ of evidence.272 
Despite this ‘‘aura of credibility,’’ forensic individualization is not 
without shortcomings.273  Even though some scholars still challenge 
																																																																																																																																
 266. For an in-depth discussion on the shortcomings of forensic science and the 
expected disparity in admissibility standards when defendants will seek to admit 
fMRI technology, see generally Teitcher, supra note 151. 
 267. See id. at 375--85 (listing other bases of methods and evidence including shoe 
prints, bite marks, tool marks, firearms, handwriting, and hair samples). 
 268. See Brooke G. Malcom, Convictions Predicated on DNA Evidence Alone: 
How Reliable Evidence Became Infallible, 38 CUMB. L. REV. 313, 313 (2008). 
 269. See Margaret A. Berger, Expert Testimony in Criminal Proceedings: 
Questions Daubert Does Not Answer, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 1125, 1129 (2003); see 
also David L. Faigman, The Tipping Point in the Law’s Use of Science: The Epidemic 
of Scientific Sophistication that Began with DNA Profiling and Toxic Torts, 67 
BROOK. L. REV. 111, 112 (2001). 
 270. See COMM. ON DNA TECH. IN FORENSIC SCI., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
DNA TECHNOLOGY IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 157 (1992). 
 271. See Berger, supra note 269, at 1139.  ‘‘Looked at through the lens of Daubert, 
fingerprints clearly should not be admissible and yet fingerprint matches obviously 
are often accurate and corroborated by other evidence.’’ Id.  Despite the fact that 
‘‘there seem[s] to be an endless number of possible permutations consisting of loops, 
whorls, arches and deltas,’’ the theory that this ‘‘abundance of detail probably makes 
each individual’s fingerprint pattern unique . . . has never been scientifically verified.’’ 
Id.; see also, Roger C. Park & Michael J. Saks, Evidence Scholarship Reconsidered: 
Results of the Interdisciplinary Turn, 47 B.C. L. REV. 949, 981--82 (2006) (‘‘What 
lawyers, scholars, and the courts are discovering is that some kinds of evidence, most 
notably some of the forensic sciences, which had been all but unquestioned under 
older admissibility tests, appeared to have startling weaknesses when viewed through 
the lens of the new test.’’). See generally, Robert Epstein, Fingerprints Meet 
Daubert: The Myth of Fingerprint ‘‘Science’’ is Revealed, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 605 
(2002). 
 272. See Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic 
Science: Progress Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 654 (2007). 
 273. See Jason Schklar & Shari S. Diamond, Juror Reactions to DNA Evidence: 
Errors and Expectations, 23 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 159, 159 (1999). 
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the individualization theory underlying forensic science generally,274 
and many of these methods have little to no scientific basis,275 the 
applications to DNA, and fingerprint analysis to a lesser extent,276 
have generally been proven reliable.277  Yet, there is a general lack of 
standardization and regulation within and among fields of forensic 
science.278  Further, given that experts must interpret the evidence, 
there is the omnipresent specter of human error279 and susceptibility 
to psychological biases.280  For example, in one study, when 
fingerprint examiners were given the same set of fingerprints again, 
examiners reached different conclusions ten percent of the time.281  
Forensic experts have often failed to conduct adequate testing, or 
improperly exaggerate warranted conclusions from the data.282  In 
fact, some form of invalid or improper forensic evidence may have 
contributed to over half of the original convictions later exonerated 
by DNA evidence.283 
																																																																																																																																
 274. See Jonathan J. Koehler & Michael J. Saks, Individualization Claims in 
Forensic Science: Still Unwarranted, 75 BROOK. L. REV. 1187, 1192 (2010) (asserting 
that the ability of any forensic science, with the notable exception of DNA typing, to 
individualize any material as completely unique has never been proven). 
 275. See generally David L. Faigman, Anecdotal Forensics, Phrenology, and Other 
Abject Lessons from the History of Science, 59 HASTINGS L. J. 979 (2008); see also 
Teitcher, supra note 151, at 379 & n.217. 
 276. See Andrew C. Bernasconi, Beyond Fingerprinting: Indicting DNA Threatens 
Criminal Defendants’ Constitutional and Statutory Rights, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 979, 
1009 (2001) (‘‘Researchers theoretically have the ability to obtain and analyze all of 
the information fingerprints provide.’’). 
 277. See Teitcher, supra note 151, at 382 & n.243 (citing COMM. ON IDENTIFYING 
THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIS. CMTY., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, 
STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCES IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 7 
(2009) [hereinafter NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC 
SCIENCES]). 
 278. See id. at 382 & n.244 (citing NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING 
FORENSIC SCIENCES, supra note 277, at 7--8). 
 279. See Berger, supra note 269, at 1129. 
 280. See Itiel E. Dror & Simon A. Cole, The Vision in Blind Justice: Expert 
Perception, Judgment, and Visual Cognition in Forensic Pattern Recognition, 17 
PSYCHONOMIC BULL. & REV. 161, 162 (2010), available at http://dx.doi.org/ 
10.3758/PBR.17.2.161; see also Itiel E. Dror & Robert Rosenthal, Meta-Analytically 
Quantifying the Reliability and Biasability of Forensic Experts, 53 J. FORENSIC SCI. 
900, 900 (2008). 
 281. See Bradford T. Ulery et al., Repeatability and Reproducibility of Decisions 
by Latent Fingerprint Examiners, 7 PUB. LIBR. SCI. ONE e32800, 1 (2012), available 
at http://www.plosone.org/article/info:doi/10.1371/journal.pone.0032800. 
 282. See Saul M. Kassin et al., The Forensic Confirmation Bias: Problems, 
Perspectives, and Proposed Solutions, 2 J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 42, 
43 (2013). 
 283. See id. (citing BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE 
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG (Harvard Univ. Press ed., 2011)); see also, 
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Because of its deficiencies, jurors have a propensity to overvalue 
forensic evidence-----even DNA profiling.284  One study showed that, 
without adequate explanation, many jurors are not able to accurately 
assess the reliability of DNA profiling methods.285  Despite this 
weakness, jurors in the same study that had greater pretrial trust in 
DNA evidence were more likely to convict the defendant.286  
Alarmingly, in another study, the ‘‘increase in [jurors’] perceived 
probative value [of all the evidence] was most prominent when the 
DNA evidence was of a moderate or weak standard.’’287  Some mock 
jurors in yet another study practically disregarded statistically 
significant laboratory error rates when given an extremely low 
‘‘random match probability;’’288 this was probably caused at least 
partially by the difficulty many jurors face when trying to 
comprehend statistical information.289  Prosecutors exacerbate the 
problem with various misstatements and exaggerations.290 
C. Confusing the Issue 
The second factor under FRE 403 that must be weighed against the 
probative value of the use of fMRI for detection of deception under is 
its potential to confuse the jury,291 or even judges. 
1. Juror Problems 
Evidence shows that jurors’ fact-finding abilities are generally 
sound.292  From there, however, empirical evidence paints a much 
																																																																																																																																
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCES, supra note 277, at 
42 (noting that forensic science had led to a ‘‘disturbing number of wrongful 
convictions’’). 
 284. See Joel D. Lieberman et al., Gold Versus Platinum: Do Jurors Recognize the 
Superiority and Limitations of DNA Evidence Compared to Other Types of Forensic 
Evidence?, 14 PYSCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 27, 56--57 (2008). 
 285. See id. at 50. 
 286. See id. at 52. 
 287. Lisa L. Smith et al., Understanding Juror Perceptions of Forensic Evidence: 
Investigating the Impact of Case Context on Perceptions of Forensic Evidence 
Strength, 56 J. FORENSIC SCI. 409, 413 (2011) (emphasis added). 
 288. See Jonathan J. Koehler et al., The Random Match Probability in DNA 
Evidence: Irrelevant and Prejudicial?, 35 JURIMETRICS J. 201, 216 (1995). 
 289. See infra notes 292--99 and accompanying text. 
 290. See Koehler et al., supra note 288, at 211 n.39 (giving examples of 
prosecutorial claims, such as ‘‘DNA is infallible,’’ or ‘‘an incorrect match is 
impossible’’). 
 291. FED R. EVID. 403. 
 292. See Joe S. Cecil et al., Citizen Comprehension of Difficult Issues: Lessons 
From Civil Jury Trials, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 727, 750 (1991); George Fisher, The Jury’s 
Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 705 (1997); Valerie P. Hans, Science in the 
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more dismal picture of the jury, especially its interaction with science 
and mathematics.  Case studies of juror performance in complex cases 
suggest that jurors have difficulty in comprehending and properly 
using scientific evidence.293  Jurors are particularly challenged when 
evaluating science based on statistical data.294  Even more 
troublesome is what some scholars call the ‘‘gatekeeper effect,’’ where 
jurors imbue low-quality expert testimony with undeserved credibility 
simply because they think judges inspect evidence themselves before 
its admission.295 
Jurors also have trouble identifying serious flaws in experimental 
setup and how these flaws affect the internal validity of the results.296  
The only major flaw that jurors are able to consistently detect is a 
missing control group;297 jurors are not very capable of identifying 
other confounding variables that have the potential to compromise an 
experiment’s results.298  For example, jurors have distinct trouble 
identifying an experimenter’s bias.299  Nevertheless, it may not 
completely be the jurors’ fault; at the very least, they are not alone, as 
some judges have similar difficulties. 
2. Judge Problems 
Studies suggest that judges are not much better than jurors at 
assessing scientific evidence.  Even though their self-confidence may 
																																																																																																																																
Jury Box: Jurors’ Comprehension of Mitochondrial DNA Evidence, 35 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 60 (2011). 
 293. See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, Jurors and Scientific Causation: What 
Don’t They Know, and What Can Be Done About It?, 52 JURIMETRICS 433, 434 
(2012) (citing Cecil et al., supra note 292, at 752--56) (providing case studies of juror 
performance in complex cases). 
 294. See, e.g., Hans, supra note 292, at 61; Suzanne O. Kaasa et al., Statistical 
Inference and Forensic Evidence: Evaluating a Bullet Lead Match, 31 L. & HUMAN 
BEHAV. 433, 433 (2006); Joseph Sanders, The Merits of the Paternalistic Justification 
for Restrictions on the Admissibility of Expert Evidence, 33 SETON HALL L. REV. 
881, 907 (2003); Schweitzer & Saks, supra note 293, at 434 (citing Ulrich Hoffrage et 
al., Communicating Statistical Information, 290 SCI. 2261, 2261 (2000)). 
 295. See N.J. Schweitzer & Michael J. Saks, The Gatekeeper Effect: The Impact of 
Judges’ Admissibility Decisions on the Persuasiveness of Expert Testimony, 15 
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1, 1 (2009) (asserting that judges inadvertently endorse the 
credibility of poor quality evidence by letting it into suits). 
 296. See Bradley D. McAuliff & Tejah D. Duckworth, I Spy With My Little Eye: 
Jurors’ Detection of Internal Validity Threats in Expert Evidence, 34 L. & HUM. 
BEHAV. 489 (2010). 
 297. See id. at 497. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See id. 
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overestimate their actual ability,300 judges are human, after all, and are 
thus subject to many, if not all, of the same cognitive shortcomings.301  
In the same vein, judges are also prone to misunderstanding statistical 
information.302  After surveying four hundred state court judges, some 
scholars went so far as to say that judges ‘‘lack the scientific literacy 
required for a Daubert analysis.’’303  The same study even suggests 
that only about five percent of those judges could demonstrate a clear 
understanding of falsifiability or error rates.304  Judges, like jurors, 
also ‘‘have difficulty identifying methodologically flawed expert 
testimony.’’ 305  Judges may err on the side of caution when applying a 
Daubert analysis, with some empirical research suggesting that judges 
are more likely to exclude evidence the more quantitatively complex 
it is.306 
																																																																																																																																
 300. See Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 
155 U. PA. L. REV. 165, 190--91 (2006) (extrapolating this conclusion from 
comparisons between actuarial and clinical predictions of future dangerousness). 
 301. See Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind: Heuristics and Biases, 86 
CORNELL L. REV. 777, 821 (2001) (showing that judges were influenced by cognitive 
heuristics such as anchoring, framing effects, hindsight bias, representativeness, and 
egocentric biases); Barbara A. Spellman, On the Supposed Expertise of Judges in 
Evaluating Evidence, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 4--6 (2007). 
 302. See Neil Vidmar & Shari S. Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. 
L. REV. 1121, 1170 (2001) (citing THE EVOLVING ROLE OF STATISTICAL ASSESSMENTS 
AS EVIDENCE IN THE COURTS (Stephen E. Fienberg ed., 1989)). 
 303. See McAuliff & Duckworth, supra note 296, at 489 (citing Sophia Gatowski et 
al., Asking the Gatekeepers: A National Survey of Judges on Judging Expert 
Evidence in a Post-Daubert World, 25 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 433 (2001)). 
 304. See Gatowski et al., supra note 303, at 452; see also Kittay, supra note 35, at 
1397.  ‘‘It is difficult to grasp how a proper Daubert inquiry can take place when 96% 
of state judges do not understand th[ese] benchmark criteri[a].’’ Id. at 1391.  The 
Daubert court referred to falsifiability as a ‘‘key question.’’ Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993). 
 305. See McAuliff & Duckworth, supra note 296, at 489 (citing Margaret B. 
Kovera & Bradley D. McAuliff, The Effects of Peer Review and Evidence Quality on 
Judge Evaluations of Psychological Science: Are Judges Effective Gatekeepers?, 85 
J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 574 (2000)). 
 306. See Mara L. Merlino et al., Judicial Gatekeeping and the Social Construction 
of the Admissibility of Expert Testimony, 26 BEHAV. SCI. & LAW 200--02 (2008) 
(suggesting that some judges refuse to admit evidence simply because they have 
difficulty grasping its qualitative complexity).  An alternative explanation that has 
been suggested is that judges assess scientific evidence with a sufficiency standard 
instead of a lower admissibility bar to evidence. See Michael D. Green & Joseph 
Sanders, Admissibility Versus Sufficiency: Controlling the Quality of Expert Witness 
Testimony in the United States (Wake Forest Univ. Legal Studies Paper No. 
2016468; Univ. of Hous. Law Ctr. Paper No. 2016468, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2016468. 
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3. No Problem: Jurors Are on the Same Page as Judges 
Ultimately, even though juries may get more verdicts objectively 
wrong than society would be comfortable with,307 jurors generally 
perform consistently well when assessed with external criteria of 
performance.308  One scholar suggests that juror competence should 
not be assessed on an absolute scale (that is, as compared to factual 
truth) or even to that of expert witnesses; competence is more 
properly assessed across different kinds of evidence, or compared to 
the competence of judges.309  Failure to completely comprehend trial 
evidence, even scientific or technical in nature, does not produce a 
significant departure from the assessments of judges in the same 
cases.310  Even though deficiencies in understanding evidence are 
undesirable, they ultimately do not have a significant effect on 
verdicts.311 
Often, attorneys and judges exacerbate the problem and confuse 
juries further with their explanations and jury instructions, 
respectively.312  Contrary to the popular notion of jurors, the less they 
understand about expert testimony, the less likely they are to be 
influenced by it.313  In fact, one study shows that judges are more 
																																																																																																																																
 307. See Cooper Ellenberg, Lie Detection: A Changing of the Guard in the Quest 
for Truth in Court?, 33 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 139, 146 (2009) (citing Bruce D. Spencer, 
Estimating the Accuracy of Jury Verdicts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 305, 307 
(2007)) (asserting that juries returned an objectively incorrect verdict one out of eight 
or nine times in a case study of 3500 trials from the 1950s). 
 308. See Neil Vidmar, Expert Evidence, the Adversary System, and the Jury, 95 
AM. J. PUB. HEALTH (SUPP. 1) S137 (2005). 
 309. See Cecil et al., supra note 292, at 764. 
 310. See Ellenberg, supra note 307, at 146 n.93 (citing Spencer, supra note 307, at 
307) (showing that judges agreed with juries in eighty percent of cases in a study on 
the accuracy of jury verdicts, as measured by judge-jury agreement even when the 
‘‘correct’’ verdict is unknown); Hans, supra note 292, at 61 (‘‘[W]hatever problems 
jurors have with comprehending trial evidence are not severe enough to produce 
outcomes that are distinctly different from the assessments of professionally trained 
judges across a range of cases.’’). 
 311. See Cecil et al., supra note 292, at 764. 
 312. Hans, supra note 292, at 61 (citing Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and 
Complex Cases: Taking Stock After Twelve Years, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL 
JURY SYSTEM 181 (R. Litan ed., 1993)); Eugene Morgulis, Juror Reactions to 
Scientific Testimony: Unique Challenges in Complex Mass Torts, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & 
TECH. L. 252, 265 (2009) (asserting that since most lawyers cannot fully grasp the 
scientific concepts themselves, they ‘‘focus on hurting experts’ credibility, muddling 
the scientific issues and making it more difficult for the jury to evaluate the 
evidence’’). 
 313. See Shari S. Diamond, Beyond Fantasy and Nightmare: A Portrait of the Jury, 
54 BUFF. L. REV. 717, 747 (2006) (‘‘When the expert’s lack of clarity prevents jurors 
from understanding the testimony, jurors who do not understand it are less likely to 
be influenced by it.’’). 
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likely than jurors to defer to expert testimony, and are also more 
likely than jurors to convict defendants when given the same scientific 
evidence.314  The notion that jurors do not comprehend expert 
testimony well, or blindly defer to experts, is inconsistent with a 
substantial body of empirical research on the subject.315 
4. Paternalism 
Given that jurors are sufficiently capable of understanding expert 
testimony, excluding such testimony on the grounds that the 
confusion it would engender substantially outweighs the probative 
value of fMRI is too paternalistic to justify its exclusion.316  In 
Scheffer, two Supreme Court Justices, Justices Stevens and Kennedy, 
even spoke out in defense of the average juror.317  Excluding reliably 
probative evidence using evidentiary rules to ‘‘protect the ignorant 
jury’’ is becoming a relic of the past.318 
The apparent concern that jurors lose all sense of reality and simply 
believe anything and everything they see depicted on a television or 
computer screen presupposes a certain naiveté and basic lack of 
intelligence on the part of juries that is not only unwarranted as a 
matter of psychological research, but is also offensive and even 
elitist. 319 
Evidence suggests that the best way to reduce jury confusion is to 
improve the clarity of both attorneys’ and experts’ explanations.320 
																																																																																																																																
 314. See Valerie P. Hans, Judges, Juries, and Scientific Evidence, 16 J.L. & POL’Y 
19, 43 & n.69 (2007) (comparing judge and juror responses after a mock trial 
conducted using mitochondrial DNA evidence). 
 315. See Vidmar, supra note 308, at S142; see also Vidmar & Diamond, supra note 
304, at 1166--67. 
 316. See generally Sanders, supra note 294. 
 317. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 318--19 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring in part) (concluding that the argument that the jury will be unable to 
properly weigh lie detector evidence ‘‘demeans and mistakes the role and 
competence of jurors in deciding the factual question of guilt or innocence’’); id. at 
337 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (‘‘[T]he reliance on a fear that the average jury is not able 
to assess the weight of this testimony reflects a distressing lack of confidence in the 
intelligence of the average American.’’). 
 318. Jeffrey Bellin, The Significance (if Any) for the Federal Criminal Justice 
System of Advances in Lie Detector Technology, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 711, 722 (2007) 
(quoting Lee v. Martinez, 96 P.3d 291, 297 (N.M. 2004)) (asserting that evidentiary 
exclusion for the purposes of ‘‘protect[ing] the jury from its perceived ignorance is a 
relic of a receding era.’’). 
 319. Galves, supra note 123, at 217--18 (footnotes omitted). 
 320. See supra note 312 and accompanying text. 
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5. The Great Legal Engine: Cross-Examination 
Much of the clarity, or obfuscation, comes from the ‘‘greatest legal 
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,’’ cross-examination.321  
There, attorneys attempt to expose inconsistencies, emphasize 
deficiencies in arguments, and reduce the effectiveness of lying.322  
Indeed, the Daubert Court itself emphasized the importance of cross-
examination in this context.323 
Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and 
careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and 
appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence . . . . 
These conventional devices, rather than wholesale exclusion . . . are 
the appropriate safeguards where the basis of scientific testimony 
meets the standards of Rule 702.324 
The drafters of FRE 702 were wary of overzealous trial court 
judges, warning that their ‘‘role as gatekeeper is not intended to serve 
as a replacement for the adversary system.’’325  Several other variables 
diminish the over-reaching effect of expert witness testimony in the 
courtroom,326 including the ‘‘hired gun’’ effect327: the more biased an 
expert is in his testimony, the more likely a juror will substantially or 
completely discount it.328 
Cross-examination would be important in the early days of fMRI’s 
admissibility in order to temper its effect.  First, expert testimony 
would need to be introduced to explain the nature of the fMRI, the 
criteria used for scoring, and the background assumptions.329  Then, 
																																																																																																																																
 321. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 J. WIGMORE, 
EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940). But see Schauer, supra note 74, at 1195 (citing Jules 
Epstein, The Great Engine that Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the 
Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 774--82 (2007)) (asserting that 
cross-examination is not as effective as television writers and viewers believe). 
 322. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1194. 
 323. Bellin, supra note 318, at 721. 
 324. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 596 (1993). 
 325. FED. R. EVID. 702 advisory committee’s note (amended 2000). 
 326. Emily L. Foster, Anchoring and the Expert Witness Testimony: Do 
Countervailing Forces Offset Anchoring Effects of Expert Witness Testimony?, 77 
TENN L. REV. 623, 625 (2010); Lieberman et al., supra note 286, at 52; cf. Lora M. 
Levett & Margaret B. Kovera, The Effectiveness of Opposing Expert Witnesses for 
Educating Jurors About Unreliable Expert Evidence, 32 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 363, 363 
(2008) (asserting that competing expert witnesses caused a general skepticism toward 
all the evidence, regardless of its objective quality, instead of sensitizing mock jurors 
to methodological deficiencies in the evidence). 
 327. Schauer & Spellman, supra note 5, at 23 & n.82. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Keckler, supra note 1, at 538. 
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cross-examination or rival expert testimony would need to focus on 
potential issues such as the error rate, possible contamination, invalid 
assumptions, etc.330  This process would help expose the shortcomings 
of fMRI technology and educate the jurors at the same time.331  The 
benefits of this process have already been highlighted within the 
context of fMRI imaging: researchers who claimed to have found a 
disproportionate effect of fMRI images conceded that informing test 
subjects of the technology’s limitations practically eliminated its 
effect.332  If, or when, the technology becomes reliable enough to 
satisfy FRE 702, the solution is not wholesale exclusion, but to allow 
the judicial system to properly run its course with the expectation that 
jurors ultimately decide its evidentiary value for themselves.  The 
confusion created and perpetuated by attorneys, expert witnesses, 
and judges cannot be grounds for exclusion of sufficiently probative 
evidence. 
D. Misleading the Jury: The Jurors Are Already Misled 
Another factor against which the probative value of fMRI 
deception detection must be weighed is its potential to mislead the 
jury.333  Much like its potential for unfair prejudice, critics worry that 
jurors will abandon their own abilities and solely rely on evidence 
fMRI can provide.  Determining the weight and credibility of 
testimony is thought to be the ‘‘province of the jury,’’ composed of 
jurors ‘‘presumed to be fitted for it by their natural intelligence and 
their practical knowledge of men and the ways of men.’’334  Jurors may 
not, however, be properly endowed with the natural intelligence 
necessary for such a task: jurors have been shown to consistently 
																																																																																																																																
 330. Id. at 538.  See supra Part III.A for a discussion on various methodological 
problems that could be raised on cross-examination.  On the absurdity of the 
assertion that fMRI technology cannot be cross-examined, see Galves, supra note 
123, at 225 (stating that the objection that images cannot be cross-examined like a 
live witness should be overruled every time it is raised). 
 331. Cheryl Boudreau & Mathew D. McCubbins, Competition in the Courtroom: 
When Does Expert Testimony Improve Jurors’ Decisions?, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL 
STUD. 793, 815 (2009) (‘‘[The] back and forth that occurs between witnesses and 
lawyers during trials . . . [is] beneficial not only because [it] close[s] the sophistication 
gap, but also because of the way this closing of the sophistication gap occurs.’’). 
 332. McCabe et al, supra note 183, at 575.  ‘‘Questioning the validity of the fMRI 
evidence reduced the proportion of guilty verdicts rendered to the level of the control 
condition that was not presented with any evidence of lying.’’ Id. at 574. But see 
Michael et al., supra note 227. 
 333. FED R. EVID. 403. 
 334. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 313 (1998) (plurality opinion) (citing 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 140 U.S. 76, 88 (1891)). 
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make poor credibility assessments based on both behavioral cues and 
contextual information.335  As such, fMRI technology can assist jurors 
in making credibility assessments without replacing their role as 
ultimate arbiters of credibility judgment, as shown in the following 
sections. 
1. Credibility Assessment 
Research generally shows that humans are very poor at making 
credibility assessments, and detecting lies or liars.336  Even though 
humans are good at lying, we have serious difficulty discerning lies in 
others.337  An average person’s ability to detect deception in a face-to-
face interaction with another individual is only slightly better than 
chance.338  Despite intuitively having more interaction with deception, 
even those in law enforcement perform only slightly better than 
average people in the same tasks.339  Not only are humans bad at 
detecting deception, we have a false sense of confidence in our 
abilities, leading us to believe that we are better than we actually 
are.340  Generally, humans use ‘‘the demeanor of witnesses, their past 
record of truth telling, the internal coherence of their stories, and the 
external coherence of their stories with the stories of others’’ to assess 
witness credibility.341 
a. Credibility Assessment Using Demeanor 
Social science indicates that laypeople poorly assess credibility 
when relying on behavioral cues, such as ‘‘facial expressions, tone of 
																																																																																																																																
 335. See infra Part III.D.1 for a discussion on jurors’ poor credibility assessment. 
 336. Seaman, supra note 3, at 435 n.36. 
 337. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 223 (citing ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING 
LIES AND DECEIT: PITFALLS AND OPPORTUNITIES (2d ed. 2008)). 
 338. Id. at 2 (citing Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch A Liar?, 
46 AM. PSYCHOL. 913 (1991)); Schauer, supra note 74, at 1213 n.114 (citing various 
studies that place the ceiling of the ability of untrained people to determine truth 
telling in others around sixty percent). 
 339. Keckler, supra note 1, at 514 n.18 (citing Christian A. Meissner & Saul M. 
Kassin, ‘‘He’s Guilty!’’: Investigator Bias in Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 L. 
& HUM. BEHAV. 469, 472 (2002) (showing in a review of studies no effect of training, 
except increased likelihood of labeling all individuals as deceitful, yielding more Type 
II errors, along with increased false confidence in one’s abilities)). 
 340. Seaman, supra note 3, at 435 n.36; see also Meixner, supra note 24, at 1465 
(asserting that test subjects were ‘‘unable to discern how effectively they determined 
credibility based on demeanor evidence’’). 
 341. Schauer, supra note 74, at 1195 (citing James P. Timony, Demeanor 
Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV. 903, 907--13 (2000)). 
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voice, aversion of gaze, and general nervousness.’’342  Instead, people 
are better able to detect deception when they can discern body 
language that subconsciously ‘‘leaks’’ information, which a liar would 
prefer to keep hidden.343  People assess the veracity of statements 
based on emotional cues at near chance accuracy.344  In one 
experiment, an attempt to train test subjects with a method that 
assists in discerning verbal and nonverbal cues to detect deception 
resulted in even lower accuracy and, despite that reduced accuracy, 
higher confidence than those not trained in the accuracy of their 
judgments.345  A meta-analysis of the most current research, which 
included results from over 24,000 people, found a fifty-four percent 
accuracy rate in assessing deception judgments.346 
b. Credibility Assessment Using Context 
Research also indicates that laypeople poorly assess credibility 
when relying on the ‘‘context, consistency, and depth of witnesses’ 
statements.’’347  Allowing people to take personal biases and context 
into consideration marginally improves lie detection accuracy, but 
only in certain situations.348  Even allowing jurors to cross-check 
																																																																																																																																
 342. Meixner, supra note 24, at 1452, 1463; Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using 
Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2565 (2008) (citing Bella 
M. DePaulo et al., Cues to Deception, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 74 (2003)) (‘‘[F]ew 
reliable cues to deception exist and in particular, the cues widely believed by the 
public to signify deception generally do not.’’). 
 343. Jeremy A. Blumenthal, A Wipe of the Hands, a Lick of the Lips: The Validity 
of Demeanor Evidence in Assessing Witness Credibility, 72 NEB. L. REV. 1157, 1201 
(1993). 
 344. See Paul Ekman & Maureen O’Sullivan, Who Can Catch a Liar?, 46 AM. 
PSYCHOL. 913 (1991); see also Olin G. Wellborn III, Demeanor, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 
1075, 1075 (1991) (‘‘According to the empirical evidence, ordinary people cannot 
make effective use of demeanor in deciding whether to believe a witness. On the 
contrary, there is some evidence that the observation of demeanor diminishes rather 
than enhances the accuracy of credibility judgments.’’). See generally Meixner, supra 
note 24 (describing this experiment in more depth). 
 345. See generally Saul M. Kissin & Christina T. Fong, ‘‘I’m Innocent!’’: Effects of 
Training on Judgments of Truth and Deception in the Interrogation Room, 23 LAW 
& HUM. BEHAV. 499 (1999); see also, Meixner, supra note 24, at 1464 n.99 (2012) 
(citing Kissin & Fong, supra, at 499). 
 346. Meixner, supra note 24, at 1466--67 (2012) (citing Charles F. Bond, Jr. & Bella 
M. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
REV. 214, 216--17, 219 (2006)). 
 347. Id. at 1468. 
 348. Max Minzner, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias, and Context, 29 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2557, 2568--78 (2008) (asserting that using contextual cues 
improves deception detection when in line with personal biases, while it reduces 
deception detection to under-chance accuracy when not in line with said biases). 
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stories by asking questions only marginally improved truth or lie 
detection accuracy.349  Assuming arguendo that there would be a 
marginal improvement if jurors were allowed to ask questions during 
trial, the most optimistic juror credibility studies find around sixty 
percent accuracy.350 
IV.  fMRI MAY CHANGE EVERYTHING, BUT FRE 403 CHANGES 
NOTHING 
This Note proceeds on the very strong assumption that fMRI 
deception detection technology will improve to the point of satisfying 
Daubert and its accompanying case law.  On one hand, jurors do not 
attribute more subjective weight than the objective value of fMRI 
images, which means that these images do not create unfair prejudice 
that outweigh their probative value.  On the other hand, jurors 
currently overvalue strongly relied upon forensic evidence such as 
fingerprints and DNA.  Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion in Scheffer 
is ultimately non-binding on any court that will pass upon fMRI’s 
admissibility.351  Although once thought to be exclusively within the 
‘‘province of the jury,’’ empirical evidence shows that jurors are 
simply inept at making consistent and accurate credibility 
determinations.352  Courts have several options that can dampen the 
potential negative impact of its admission, while its admission itself 
will serve to perfect the technology and its application.353  Ultimately, 
once this technology satisfies Daubert, FRE 403 will not be a bar to 
its admissibility. 
A. fMRI Images Remain Innocent Until Proven Guilty 
FRE 403 will not preclude the admissibility of fMRI deception 
detection because its resulting images do not create undue prejudice.  
Although of deep previous concern to many scholars,354 new evidence 
shows that jurors do not give disproportionate value to fMRI 
images;355 as such, they cannot be excluded under FRE 403 for 
creating undue prejudice that substantially outweighs its probative 
value.  The question is not whether the fMRI images create prejudice, 
																																																																																																																																
 349. Meixner, supra note 24, at 1468--74. 
 350. Id. at 1473 & n.143 (citing Maria Hartwig et al., Detecting Deception via 
Strategic Disclosure of Evidence, 29 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 477 (2005)). 
 351. See infra Part IV.C; see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998). 
 352. See infra Part IV.D. 
 353. See infra Parts IV.E, IV.F. 
 354. See supra notes 213--16 and accompanying text. 
 355. See supra notes 241--47 and accompanying text. 
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as creating prejudice by producing powerful enough evidence to 
convince a neutral third party of the persuasiveness of an argument is 
the foundation of our adversarial system.356  Rather, it is whether they 
are falsely powerful, in that they are more powerful than other types 
of visual evidence that the legal system consistently admits,357 and this 
disproportionate power is unjustifiable in relation to the evidence’s 
reasonable objective value.  Some scholars suggest that the admission 
of fMRI images would sacrifice procedural justice in favor of 
substantive justice.358  However, precluding fMRI images, despite 
their having no unique additional influence compared to other visual 
images359 or other neuroscientific evidence, that are both already 
routinely admissible,360 would sacrifice procedural justice owed to the 
images themselves.  Despite developing sufficient reliability to satisfy 
Daubert, there may still be a problematic gap between its reliability 
and its ability: ‘‘[e]ven a test that is accurate enough to meet the 
Daubert standard will have serious implications for perceived 
systemic legitimacy if it is persuasive enough to yield a conviction 
without other strong supporting evidence but is not accurate enough 
to ensure that an innocent person is never misdiagnosed.’’361 
																																																																																																																																
 356. Galves, supra note 123, at 222 (‘‘[C]reating prejudice is exactly what an 
advocate is doing when she is advocating for her client or when a witness is testifying 
on behalf of one of the litigants-----getting the jury to believe her side of the case and 
her version of the facts.’’). 
 357. Schauer, supra note 83 (manuscript at 37--38) (‘‘[The] precise question to be 
asked about fMRI evidence therefore, is . . . whether the inflated value they produce 
is greater than the inflated value produced by the visual evidence that the legal 
system routinely admits.’’). 
 358. Meixner, supra note 24, at 1462 n.79 (discussing other potential goals of the 
justice system besides trial accuracy).  ‘‘It is not clear whether this reduction in 
procedural justice would be worth the gain in trial accuracy, though one could argue 
that modern forensic science has the same problem yet continues to be admitted.’’ Id. 
at 1487; see also Sanders, supra note 294, at 940--41. 
 359. See, e.g., David Gruber & Jacob A. Dickerson, Persuasive Images in Popular 
Science: Testing Judgments of Scientific Reasoning and Credibility, 21 PUB. 
UNDERSTANDING SCI. 938 (2012) (conducting a study with results showing that there 
was no discernible impact between fMRI images and artistic renderings or science-
fiction movie still shots depicting the brain). See generally Jewel, supra note 227 
(discussing the advantages of visual advocacy). 
 360. See supra notes 234--36 and accompanying text (discussing how fMRI images 
added no additional impact as compared to neuropsychological testing results); see 
also Chloe Boyle, Juror Perception of fMRI Evidence (Sept. 14, 2011) (unpublished 
M.S. thesis, California State University, Fullerton) (on file with author) (comparing 
juror evaluation of conditions with the variables of fMRI imaging and accompanying 
expert testimony in a legal setting). 
 361. Meixner, supra note 24, at 1487.  ‘‘Though truth and legitimacy are certainly 
distinct functions of the jury trial, legitimacy is closely tied to the system’s ability (real 
or apparent) to discover the truth.’’ Seaman, supra note 3, at 472 n.193.  This 
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B. Jurors Overvalue Other Types of Evidence 
The gap between the scientific reliability of evidence and the 
ability of such evidence to secure a criminal conviction may be 
inevitable,362 as jurors often overvalue weak or unreliable types of 
evidence, such as eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence, which 
are heavily relied upon in securing wrongful convictions.363  
Eyewitness testimony has been called the ‘‘single greatest cause of 
wrongful convictions’’ in this country.364  Some types of forensic 
evidence are routinely admitted despite the fact that they might not 
satisfy Daubert if their admissibility was decided for the first time 
today,365 and weak forensic evidence has led to a ‘‘disturbing number 
of convictions.’’366  Yet, these weak types of evidence serve important 
functions in the law, and so too will fMRI deception detection 
technology once it satisfies the Daubert threshold.367 
C. Justice Thomas’s Scheffer Opinion Is Not Binding 
Indeed, Justice Thomas’s apprehension toward lie detection 
technology and the usurpation of the jury’s role in his Scheffer 
opinion applies to all expert testimony routinely admitted in court.368  
As aforementioned, other types of evidence lend themselves to 
undeserved deference, yet jurors are still regularly, and 
																																																																																																																																
sentiment is traceable back to William Blackstone’s well-known maxim, ‘‘it is better 
that ten guilty persons escape, than that one innocent man suffer.’’ 4 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358. 
 362. To the author’s knowledge, there is no published research on the reasoning 
underlying the gap between evidentiary reliability and overvaluation.  It is possible 
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admitted’’).  ‘‘Justice Thomas’s distinction notwithstanding, the problem of deference 
to expert opinion is a problem for all expert testimony.  There is no reason to believe 
that jurors will be less able to assess neuroscience evidence than they are to assess 
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fundamentally, trusted to assess such evidence for themselves.369  
However, even though some scholars emphasize the superiority of 
fMRI deception detection’s scientific reliability or validity over either 
polygraph technology370 or forensic science371 as a basis for eventual 
admissibility, another scholar suggests that the assumption that courts 
admit these types of evidence because of their reliability may be 
unwarranted.372  These other types of evidence will continue to be 
admitted because of their strong tradition of admissibility,373 but that 
same tradition should not also serve to keep fMRI deception 
detection technology out of the courtroom due simply to its 
superficial similarity to the polygraph as a lie detector.374 
As far as Justice Thomas’s ‘‘province of the jury’’ concern goes, the 
Court’s decision in Scheffer does not preclude the admission of fMRI 
lie detection technology.  As an opinion joined by only a plurality of 
the court, it has no binding precedential effect on future court 
decisions.375  The Court upheld the military’s ban on the use of 
polygraph technology in court-martial proceedings on the narrow 
grounds of the government having a legitimate interest in doing so.376  
The oft-quoted phrase of the case, ‘‘[a] fundamental premise of our 
criminal trial system is that ‘the jury is the lie detector,’’’ lies within 
Justice Thomas’s plurality opinion.377  Indeed, Justice Kennedy 
emphasized the court’s narrow holding in his concurring opinion.378  
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supra note 3, at 462 & n.148. 
 378. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 318 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (concurring in the 
judgment on the grounds that the per se military ban on polygraph evidence served a 
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Thus, Scheffer does not preclude lie detection technology of sufficient 
reliability from being admissible simply on the notion that it would 
affect the jury’s assessment of witness credibility.379  The prospect of 
this technology reaching sufficient reliability ultimately ‘‘raises 
fundamental questions about the role of the jury in our . . . justice 
system[], and indeed about the purpose of the jury trial itself.’’380 
D. The Jury Needs Whatever Help It Can Get 
FRE 403 will not preclude the admissibility of fMRI deception 
detection because, instead of misleading the jury, it will provide a 
confused jury with much-needed assistance in making more accurate 
credibility assessments.  Given the great difficulty jurors have with 
detecting lies,381 fMRI deception detection technology will assist the 
jury’s assessment of witness credibility without displacing its role as 
the ultimate arbiter of truth.  The average ability to detect deception 
based on demeanor is around chance, with the use of contextual 
factors only marginally improving the ability to detect lies.382  Once 
this technology improves, it will certainly assist in the juror’s 
credibility assessment; however, introducing this technology will do 
anything but replace the jury.383  The notion of truth exists across a 
spectrum,384 and most objectively untrue statements uttered by trial 
witnesses are ‘‘mistakes, exaggerations, or distortions rather than 
bald-faced intentional lies.’’385  Further, as it stands, this technology 
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LAW § 875 (2d ed. 1923)) (quoting Dean Wigmore) (‘‘If there is ever devised a 
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Kittay, supra note 35, at 1353 (2007) (asserting that courts might bar admission of 
fMRI lie detection technology because of ‘‘society’s suspicion and fear of ‘mind 
reading’ technologies’’); Meixner, supra note 24, at 1460 (‘‘Thus, even if a lie-
detection tool achieved 100% accuracy when used in the hands of an expert, it would 
likely be precluded from use because it would ‘invade the . . . province of the jury’ 
and ‘[b]y its very nature . . . diminish the jury’s role in making credibility 
determinations.’’’). 
 380. Seaman, supra note 3, at 434. 
 381. See supra Part III.D. 
 382. See supra Part III.D1.a. 
 383. See Seaman, supra note 3, at 475--78 (outlining the remaining role the jury will 
play in our justice system in light of the admission of fMRI lie detection technology). 
 384. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 385. Seaman, supra note 3, at 476. 
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cannot distinguish between true lies and false memories or assertions 
of subjective truth.386  A jury would need to assess other evidence 
presented that may override the test results, or prove to be more 
probative.387  The jury must also determine the credibility of the 
expert himself, assessing ‘‘bias, defects in test methodology, the 
reliability of the particular machinery used, or even outright 
corruption and deceit.’’388 
fMRI deception detection’s probative value will not be 
substantially outweighed by its potential to confuse the jury under 
FRE 403 because it is not intrinsically more confusing than other 
types of evidence, and confusion stemming from evidence may 
actually be caused by attorneys and judges.  The difficulty jurors have 
with scientific evidence is shared by judges, which reminds us of the 
famous quote, ‘‘Democracy is the worst form of government, except 
for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.’’389  
The right to a jury trial, with all of its faults, is a constitutional right 
and is here to stay for the foreseeable future.390  Deceptiveness 
‘‘should be presented as probabilistic rather than a categorical 
conclusion that a given witness is truthful or deceptive.’’391  The 
statistical analysis required to produce the fMRI data and images, as 
well as this probabilistic conclusion of deceptiveness, may initially 
confuse the jury given its difficulty with mathematics.392  Nevertheless, 
the solution for this confusion is not for the legal system to 
paternalistically exclude any evidence that has the propensity to 
confuse, as such paternalism undermines the intelligence of the 
average American.393  Rather, attorneys must enhance the clarity of 
their explanations. 
																																																																																																																																
 386. See id. at 476 n.215. 
 387. Pardo, supra note 23, at 318. 
 388. Seaman, supra note 3, at 475. 
 389. Sir Winston Churchill, Address Before House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), in 
444 THE OFFICIAL REPORT, HOUSE OF COMMONS (5TH SERIES) 203, 206--07, available 
at http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/nov/11/parliament-bill. 
 390. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also Stronge, supra note 4, at 113 (noting the 
societal importance of the jury system as one that ‘‘enables society at large to be 
involved in the determination of guilt, and when mistakes are made, either by 
exonerating a guilty defendant or imprisoning an innocent one, society shares in the 
responsibility for this mistake’’). 
 391. Langleben & Moriarty, supra note 8, at 227. 
 392. See supra notes 293--94 and accompanying text. 
 393. United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 337 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (‘‘[T]he 
reliance on a fear that the average jury is not able to assess the weight of this 
testimony reflects a distressing lack of confidence in the intelligence of the average 
American.’’). 
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E. Additional Suggestions to Lessen Potential Harmful Impacts 
of fMRI Deception Detection. 
Scholars have presented additional suggestions to lessen any 
potential harmful impact that fMRI deception detection technology 
may have.  Because jurors with more formal education or background 
in science and mathematics perform better in assessing scientific 
evidence,394 some scholars suggest conferring that benefit by neutrally 
training the jury through a short tutorial before the beginning of the 
trial.395  As mentioned in the advisory committee notes of FRE 403 
itself,396 proper cautionary jury instructions may be fashioned for two 
reasons.  First, they are created to remind jurors of the technical and 
legal limits of this technology,397 so that they do not overvalue or 
misapply the evidence produced.398  Second, to avoid the gatekeeper 
effect, jurors must understand that they are to assess the reliability 
and weight given to the evidence by virtue of the testimony given, and 
not the fact that it merely satisfies Daubert.399  Even more drastic 
recommendations include appointing special masters selected for 
their expertise in the subject matter to serve as expert witnesses,400 or 
a moratorium on all non-research uses of fMRI deception detection 
until a regulatory agency can assess the research and adopt field-wide 
standards.401 
F. The Admission of fMRI Will Only Improve Its Reliability 
Ultimately, fMRI deception detection’s reliability will only 
improve with its admission; with this increase in reliability,402 the 
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initial apprehension about fMRI will wane.403  If DNA, as the ‘‘gold 
standard’’ of evidence, provides a blueprint for the admissibility of 
fMRI deception detection, it might be at least another decade or two 
before the developmental gap between the theory and technology 
closes enough to reach a level of reliability and validity to be 
admissible in the judicial system.404  The challenges presented by the 
adversarial process through cross-examination or rival expert 
testimony will serve to refine the underlying process and presentation 
of this technique, as they did with DNA evidence.405  One scholar 
fears that seeking the admission of this technique too quickly might 
preclude its admission for the foreseeable future,406 which may mean 
it is already too late given the Semrau decision.  It is more likely, 
however, that rejecting its admissibility will not be held to strict 
precedent, and will rather be reconsidered in light of the technique’s 
technological advancement.407 
CONCLUSION 
Once fMRI deception detection technology reaches a level of 
reliability sufficient enough to satisfy FRE 702 and Daubert, FRE 403 
should not bar its admission.  The images that fMRI deception 
detection techniques produce are not inherently overly prejudicial, 
and do not produce the ill-advised initial fear of a ‘‘Christmas tree 
effect.’’408  fMRI images are no more influential than neuroscience 
evidence that has already been admissible for decades.409  It would be 
hypocritical to disallow fMRI deception detection evidence, yet 
routinely allow other types of evidence that are often unreliable, and 
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also often overvalued by the jury given their independent objective 
evidentiary value.410  Lie detection evidence is not precluded from 
admission as a matter of stare decisis, given that Justice Thomas’s 
plurality opinion in Scheffer has no binding precedential effect.411  
Considering jurors’ woeful credibility assessment abilities, they need 
the assistance that this technology will be able to provide. 
Ultimately, this Note raises two issues that pervade discussions in 
the larger legal arena.  First, this Note addresses what encapsulates 
the concept of evidentiary reliability, and how different standards of 
reliability may be applied to different types of evidence.  Second, this 
Note addresses what the role of the jury, and the jury trial as a whole, 
is within our justice system.  Many of the issues that scholars raise 
with regard to fMRI deception detection technology are not unique 
to this technique, which ultimately raises the following question: ‘‘Is 
expert evidence really different?’’412  As a thought experiment goes, if 
(or when) lie detection technology were to reach perfect accuracy, 
would there be a role for the jury, or jury trial, whatsoever?413  Would 
it even have to reach perfect accuracy, or would it simply have to be 
more accurate than the juries themselves?  This technology may 
implicate issues that will cause problems at first,414 but with the right 
protections and safeguards,415 it will ultimately serve, and greatly 
benefit, society by delivering greater justice.  In our justice system’s 
search for objective truth, this technology will certainly only uncover 
more of it, which is a foundational purpose of our adversarial justice 
system.  Precluding its admission would not only be an injustice to 
those that this technology could assist, from defendants to jurors, but 
it would also be an injustice to justice itself. 
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